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Dissatisfaction with the governance of public companies is as old as the public 
company itself, but public concern about corporate governance is spasmodic. When the 
stock market booms, as in the 1990s, investors are merrily engrossed counting their 
profits and don’t fret about governance. When stocks crash amid an epidemic of 
corporate scandals, as in 2001, public fury erupts and demands change. To calm the 
storm, Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the stock 
exchanges make elaborate pretenses to effect bold solutions. With luck, stock prices 
revive and investors relax until the next crash. By then, the old troupe of legislators and 
regulators has been replaced by a new cast. 
The crash and scandals of 2001 show that prior reforms did not cure the ills of 
corporate governance, and there is little reason to think that the recent spate of reforms 
will be any more effective. Despite a partial recovery of stock prices, many symptoms of 
the underlying disease persist, including excessive executive compensation, empire 
building by managements, and entrenchment of incumbents against unwanted takeovers. 
Unfortunately, investors seem to have been mollified by the recent reforms, and even 
these inadequate measures may be emasculated by the management lobby. 
The fundamental problem of corporate governance remains what it has always been: 
the separation of ownership and control. No reform can succeed unless it overcomes this 
contradiction. Corporate executives are determined to preserve their privileges and a 
number of scholars deny this claim; in effect, these Panglosses consider the status quo the 
best of all possible worlds. Others recognize that corporate governance is broken and that 
initiatives recently instituted or proposed are inadequate. Several have proposed changes, 
some of which would be beneficial, but none promises to eliminate the separation of 
ownership and control. 
The stakes in the corporate governance conflict are high. The loss in equity values 
from separation of ownership and control is hard to gauge but certainly amount to 
trillions of dollars.1 This waste discourages public ownership. Robert Monks estimates 
that excessive executive compensation alone effectively imposes a 10% tax on 
shareholders and that this cost is spurring investors to flee into private equity.2 The losses 
borne by employees and customers are even harder to calculate. However, employment 
and wages tend to grow faster and prices tend to be lower at more profitable firms, so the 
costs of inefficient corporate governance to these other constituencies are certainly 
substantial. 
The problems of corporate governance should not be overstated: 
Despite the alleged flaws in its governance system, the U.S. economy has 
 1. The loss in equity values from staggered boards alone has been estimated at $350 billion. See infra 
note 44. 
 2. Symposium on Corporate Elections 17 (Lucian A. Bebchuck ed., Ctr. For Law, Econ. & Bus., 
Discussion Paper No. 448, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=471640 (comments of Robert Monks); 
see also Michael Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61 (claiming 
that “[t]he publicly held corporation . . . has outlived its usefulness in many sectors of the economy because of 
the central weakness of the public corporation—the conflict between owners and managers over the control and 
use of corporate resources”). 
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performed very well, both on an absolute basis and particularly relative to other 
countries. U.S. productivity gains in the past decade have been exceptional, and 
the U.S. stock market has consistently outperformed other world indices over 
the last two decades, including the period since the scandals broke. In other 
words, the broad evidence is not consistent with a failed system. If anything, it 
suggests a system that is well above average.3
Nonetheless, we should not be complacent. The threat to the American economy 
from poor corporate governance is greater now than ever. Formerly, capital flows were 
obstructed by national barriers, and only a few industrialized countries offered an 
attractive investment climate. Financial markets are now global and many formerly 
undeveloped third-world nations compete for capital. If American companies are 
wasteful, investors will ship their money elsewhere, with dire consequences to 
employment and economic growth in America. 
Part II of this article describes the corporate governance debate. Part III explains 
why the separation of ownership and control is the problem of corporate governance and 
why past reforms have failed. Part IV discusses the reforms instituted and proposed after 
the recent scandals and why they too will fail. Part V urges a means of finally solving the 
problem of corporate governance. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The debate over corporate governance waxes and wanes counter to the fortunes of 
the stock market. The bull market of the 1920s abruptly ended with the crash of 1929, 
which ushered in the Great Depression. Congress adopted the Securities Act of 1933 and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which forbade fraud and required broad disclosure 
in securities trading and proxy solicitations by public companies.4 Although these laws 
influenced corporate governance, direct regulation was left to the states. Subsequent 
market breaks triggered new federal laws, but the core of corporate law remained the 
preserve of the states. Federal law did not, and was not designed to, end the separation of 
ownership and control. 
With general prosperity after 1945 investors lost interest in corporate governance. 
The economic stagnation of the 1970s and early 1980s revived their concern. A loose 
consensus emerged in support of the monitoring model of governance, which posited that 
separation of ownership and control can be remedied by installing a board of independent 
outside directors to choose the best managers, give them compensation with incentives to 
perform well, prevent self-serving conduct by management, and replace managers who 
do not pan out.5 Although the monitoring model was largely precatory, not legally 
mandated, it gradually exerted great influence. Most public companies now have boards 
 3. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What’s Right and 
What’s Wrong?, 15 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8, 8 (2003). 
 4. See generally Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77zz-3); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
78nn). 
 5. See MELVIN EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 162-70 (1976) (offering an early 
plug for the monitoring model); AM. LAW. INST. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Am. Law Inst. 1992) (generally advocating a monitoring model). 
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with majorities of outside directors and several “overview” committees comprised 
primarily of outside directors to deal with the firm audit, executive compensation, and 
director nominations. 
The market boom of the 1990s kept investors happily busy counting their money; 
perhaps the corporate governance problem was solved. In 2001, though, the stock market 
plummeted. Most share prices fell, especially in technology stocks, but investor fury 
focused on a few corporate scandals involving shocking misconduct. Congress, the stock 
exchanges, and the SEC all responded to investor outrage with new regulations designed 
to prevent such fiascos rather than alter the general rules of corporate governance. 
Congress enacted the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection 
Act of 2002, popularly referred to as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).6 Because many 
recent scandals involved false financial statements, Congress required CEOs and CFOs to 
certify the accuracy of financial statements to their best knowledge.7 Because corporate 
lawyers and auditors had failed to detect or divulge the shenanigans, SOX imposed rules 
to strengthen auditor independence and to demand more assertive action by lawyers who 
learn of corporate misconduct.8 The most direct intrusion into corporate governance is 
the requirement that certain actions be approved by an audit committee of the corporate 
board consisting entirely of independent directors.9 The New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and the NASDAQ also adopted rules giving a greater role to independent 
directors of listed companies.10
The stock market bottomed out and the economy’s recession ended in 2002; both 
have since managed modest recoveries, although share prices remain well below their 
pre-crash highs. Once again there is hope that the corporate governance problem has been 
conquered.11 Sober analysis suggests, however, that while the symptoms of defective 
corporate governance have moderated, the disease has not been cured.  As Paul MacAvoy 
and Ira Millstein have put it: “there is a governance mechanism in the engine of the 
corporation that is broken . . . . [T]he board was not functioning as agent for investors.”12
III. THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
A. Managerial Domination 
In 1932 Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means proclaimed in their groundbreaking The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property13 that a major problem of capitalism was the 
 6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 7. Id. § 404  (requiring CEOs and CFOs to certify certain 1934 Act filings).  
 8. Id. § 307.  
 9. Id. §§ 204, 301. 
 10. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303(A)(3) (2005), available at 
http://www.nyse.com/frameset.html?displayPage=/listed/1022221393251.html; NASD, Inc. Manual Rule 
4350(c) (2006), available at http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/index.html. 
 11. For example, the Business Roundtable, the mouthpiece of the corporate establishment, trumpets the 
growing number of companies that follow “best practices” in corporate governance. Business Roundtable 
Reports Progress in Governance, 8 Corp. Governance Rep. (BNA) 42 (Apr. 4, 2005).  
 12. PAUL W. MACAVOY & IRA M. MILLSTEIN, THE RECURRENT CRISIS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 7, 9 
(2003). 
 13. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
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separation of ownership and control: that is, public companies were not controlled by 
their owners, the shareholders, but by the managers, the supposed agents of the 
shareholders. Managers often exerted their control to benefit themselves, not 
shareholders.  Business executives and their minions often deny this thesis. They have 
resisted all recent reform initiatives by declaring that corporate governance is 
fundamentally sound; only minor tinkering is needed, and corporations are doing this on 
their own.14 This claim is untenable. 
First, CEOs influence, if not dominate, the composition and operations of corporate 
boards. New directors are typically chosen on the CEO’s recommendation.15 Most CEOs 
can at least veto nominations to the board, and they exclude anyone who might “rock the 
boat.”16 Directors so chosen naturally feel beholden to the CEO who approved them.17 
Most outside directors come from a small elite of current or former CEOs of other 
companies.18 As outside directors they tend to give the CEO the same deference that they 
want from outside directors on their own boards.19 They are wealthy, so they don’t need 
the compensation, and fighting lonely and futile battles against a CEO is not most 
people’s idea of a good time. Accordingly, if perchance an invitation is issued to 
someone who does not expect to go along with the CEO, the candidate will probably 
decline the offer. 
If independently inclined directors nonetheless sneak onto the board, the traditions 
and atmosphere of the board discourage those inclinations and encourage “groupthink.”  
Warren Buffett criticizes the prevalence of “an excessively cozy ‘boardroom 
atmosphere.’”20 As one director put it: “Being on a board was like having a merit badge. 
PROPERTY (1932). 
 14. See Business Roundtable Reports Progress in Governance, supra note 11, at 42 (painting a rosy 
picture of the state of corporate governance); David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique 
of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1028-29 (2000) (stating that corporate 
governance is working for investors now). Others make the similar argument that no further changes should be 
made until recent reforms have been given time to work. See infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 15. See ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 178 (2d ed. 2001); Anil 
Shivdasani & David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical 
Analysis, 54 J. FIN. 1829, 1835 (1999) (finding direct CEO involvement in selection of directors in 47% of 
corporations studied); James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, 
Demographic Similarity, and New Director Selection, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 60, 77 (1995). 
 16. See Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Perspective on Shareholder Nominations of Corporate Directors, 
59 BUS. LAW. 95, 100 (2003) (“Even a nominating committee composed entirely of independent directors is not 
likely to choose a candidate put forward by shareholders . . . unless the candidate is already known personally . . 
. as someone . . . who would ‘not rock the boat.’”). 
 17. See Nell Minow & Kit Bingham, The Ideal Board, in ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 496, 497 (1995) (“Even the ablest and most honorable directors are inevitably 
influenced by the ‘dance with the one who brought you’ syndrome. As long as a director is brought in by the 
CEO, he will naturally feel that it is to the CEO that he owes his loyalty.”). 
 18. See Gerald F. Davis et al., The Small World of the American Corporate Elite, 1982-2001, 1 
STRATEGIC ORG. 301 (2003). 
 19. See Allen Kaufman et al., The Managerial Power Thesis Revised: CEO Compensation and the 
Independence of Independent CEO Directors (unpublished manuscript) (Mar. 3, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=678381. 
 20. Letter from Warren Buffett, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, to Berkshire Hathaway Shareholders (Feb. 
21, 2003), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/message.html. See also James D. Cox & Harry L. 
Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 
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You’d fly in for a dinner, pat the CEO on the butt and fly out.”21 Outside directors fear 
that they must go along with management in order to be re-nominated.22 And, in any 
case, a director who does not enjoy backing the CEO will probably resign. 
Most boards meet about once a month and do not have their own staff. Accordingly, 
management sets the agenda; the board does not initiate, it only reacts. Even in its 
monitoring function the board is hampered by its limited time and information.23 Outside 
directors cannot match the managers’ knowledge of the firm, and in reviewing 
management proposals the board must rely on the information management deigns to 
give. These conditions led Peter Drucker, dean of business management theorists, to 
dismiss outside directors as figureheads.24
Some argue that the states seek corporate franchise fees by offering the best 
corporate law. This incentive creates a “race to the top” among the states that guarantee 
optimal treatment of investors.25 However, this market has serious barriers to entry, so it 
is doubtful that other states try very hard to challenge Delaware’s dominance.26 Certainly 
it is naive to assume that the abundant evidence of serious problems with corporate 
governance must be illusory because of a hypothetical but unconfirmed race to the top. 
CEO domination of corporate boards may have eased somewhat in the 1980s 
because of the proliferation of successful tender offers.27 However, as SEC Chairman 
William H. Donaldson has declared: 
Over the past decade or more, the chief executive position has steadily 
increased in power and influence. In some cases, the CEO has become more of 
a monarch than a manager. Many boards have become gradually more 
deferential to the opinions, judgments and decision of the CEO and senior 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 83, 99-108; Luca Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment 
from Old Europe on Post-Enron Corporate Governance Reforms, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 930 (2003) 
(quoting the Warren Buffett letter); Robert J. Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board: Behaviorial Science 
and Corporate Law, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1, 37-49 (1981). 
 21. PATRICK A. REARDON, HARD LESSONS FOR MANAGEMENT, DIRECTORS AND PROFESSIONALS 130 
(2003) (quoting Robert H. Campbell, former chairman and CEO of Sunoco).  
 22. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for 
Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 874-75 (1991).  
 23. See MELVIN EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 141-43 (1976). 
 24. PETER DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 92 (rev. ed. 1972); see also Michael B. Dorff, Does 
One Hand Wash the Other? Testing the Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive 
Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 255, 263-69 (2005) (reviewing literature on CEO power). 
 25. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, REGULATION, Spring 
2003, at 30; Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). 
 26. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the 
Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 563, 570-71, 581 (2002); see also Daniel J.H. 
Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The Mysterious Race to the Top/Bottom (Univ. of Utah, Leg. Stud. 
Paper No. 05-09, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=662261 (questioning whether there is a race to 
either the top or the bottom). 
 27. This is suggested by an increase in CEO turnover and in the hiring of new CEOs from outside the firm 
between 1971 and 1994. See Mark R. Huson et al., Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A 
Long-Term Perspective, 56 J. FIN. 2265 (2001). Some believe that turnover has further accelerated recently and 
infer an “increase in the board’s power vis-à-vis the CEO.” Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If 
There’s a Problem, What’s the Remedy? The Case for Compensation: Discussion and Analysis, 30 J. CORP. L. 
695 (2005). 
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management team.28
B. The Effects of Managerial Domination 
Despite the foregoing, some still deny that managers dominate corporate boards. 
More important, even if management domination exists, it is not necessarily a problem. 
Perhaps public corporations strive to serve shareholders by maximizing share value. 
However, there is abundant evidence that corporations often operate for the benefit of 
their managers, not their shareholders. 
For one, executive compensation has exploded since 199029 and is now frequently 
excessive and poorly designed to motivate executives to maximize share value, as 
recently documented by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried in Pay without Performance.30 
Some defended the meteoric rise of executive compensation in the 1990s on the ground 
that equity values had also mushroomed and that executive pay had become more tightly 
tied to performance.31 However, when profits and equity prices fell from 2001 to 2003, 
executive compensation continued to grow. Moreover, as Bebchuk and Fried show, in 
many companies executive compensation is not tied to performance.32 One study 
actually finds a negative correlation between compensation and managerial performance 
 28. William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the 2003 Washington Economic Policy 
Conference (Mar. 24, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch032403whd.htm; see also 
Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 3, at 17 (stating that the earlier decline of CEO entrenchment may have been 
reversed since 1994 by the institution of takeover defenses); Millon, supra note 14, at 1023 (stating that outside 
directors tend to defer to the CEO); Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance and Some 
Thoughts on the Role of Congress, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 495, 504-05 
(Nancy B. Rapaport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) [hereinafter CORPORATE FIASCOES]  (stating that “the CEO 
has assumed an ever-dominant role in the corporation, culminating in what people have begun to refer to as the 
‘imperial’ CEO”); D. Quinn Mills, Paradigm Lost: The Imperial CEO, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, June 22, 2003, 
at 41 (exhorting boards to curb the power of CEOs); Allen Kaufman et al., A Team Production Model of 
Corporate Governance Revisited 6 (George Wash. Univ., SMPP Working Paper No. 03-03, 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=410080 (stating that CEOs have become more powerful). 
 29. See John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Insufficient Pay Without Performance? 44-45 
(Vand. L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 05-05, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=648648 (giving data 
on growth of CEO compensation); see also Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 
21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y. 283 (2005). 
 30. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). See also MACAVOY & MILLSTEIN, supra note 12, at 75 (stating that 
executive compensation was “out of line” by the end of the 1990s); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 
Stealth Compensation via Retirement Benefits (Harvard Law & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 487, 2004), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=583861 (stating that many companies camouflage deferred compensation 
so that investors have difficulty calculating actual compensation); M.P. Narayanan & Hasan Nejat Seyhun, Do 
Managers Influence Their Pay? Evidence from Stock Price Reversals Around Executive Stock Options Grants 
(Jan. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=649804 (showing that some firms 
issue stock options on a back-date basis, picking a past date with a lower stock price than that on the decision 
date). 
 31. See Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 3 (based on statistics through 2001). Holmstrom and Kaplan 
concede, however, some problems with executive compensation: growing stock and stock option ownership 
encourages managers to manipulate accounting numbers; much executive compensation is too liquid; and “the 
size of some of the option grants has been far greater than what is necessary to retain and motivate.” Id. at 12-
13. 
 32. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 30, chs. 10-14. 
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in large firms with no large shareholders!33 Excessive compensation also correlates with 
weak shareholder rights.34
Self-dealing by executives is also common and is damaging to their corporations.35 
Public companies provide more sumptuous executive perquisites, like luxurious facilities, 
large support staffs, and corporate jets, than do comparable non-public firms.36 Some 
perquisites are difficult to recognize at all. For example, when corporate headquarters are 
relocated they are usually moved closer to the CEO’s home despite some evidence that 
these moves impair corporate performance.37
In economic theory corporate funds should be distributed to shareholders unless the 
company can invest them with a reasonable expectation of a market rate of return or 
better. In practice, though, managers reinvest corporate funds even when they lack 
promising projects.38 Thus returns on reinvested earnings are low; some studies find that 
they approach zero.39 Managers even support double taxation of corporate earnings, 
despite its high costs to investors, because ending double taxation would fuel demands 
that earnings be paid out unless managers had promising projects to finance.40 Managers 
are more risk-averse than shareholders so they capitalize companies conservatively. 
Despite the favorable tax treatment of debt, managers assume no more debt than the firm 
can handle. This furthers the managers’ goal of corporate growth. Growth increases 
prestige and is used to justify higher compensation and perquisites.41 It allows the CEO 
 33. Robert Daines et al., The Good, the Bad, and the Lucky: CEO Pay and Skill (Aug. 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=622223 (stating that some former defenders of the levels of 
executive compensation now believe that “the governance system itself is corrupted and tilted in the direction of 
management in a way that will almost inevitably lead to excesses in executive pay levels”). See also Michael C. 
Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, 
and How to Fix Them 20-21 (Harvard NOM Working Paper No. 04-28, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305. 
 34. Pornsit Jiraporn et al., CEO Compensation, Shareholder Rights, and Corporate Governance, 29 J. 
ECON. & FIN. 242 (2005).  
 35. See Elizabeth A. Gordon et al., Related Party Transactions: Associations with Corporate Governance 
and Firm Value (Aug. 2004) (European Fin. Ass’n 2004 Maastrict Meetings Paper No. 4377), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=558983 (finding that self-dealing is common and harmful, especially where corporate 
governance is weak).  
 36. See WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, MANAGERIAL CONTROL AND PERFORMANCE 65-66, 80, 86-87 (1975) 
(reviewing prior literature). 
 37. See WILLIAM H. WHYTE, CITY: REDISCOVERING THE CENTER 287-97 (1989) (noting that of 38 firms 
that left New York City in the period studied, 31 moved within eight miles of the CEO’s home, but those firms 
lagged in economic performance behind those that stayed). 
 38. See Diane K. Denis, Twenty-Five Years of Corporate Governance . . . and Counting, 10 REV. FIN. 
ECON. 191, 195 (2001) (discussing management’s incentive to make bad investment decisions); William J. 
Rafael F. La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147, 1168 (2002) 
(concluding that “poor shareholder protection is penalized with lower violations”). 
 39. See William J. Baumol et al., Efficiency of Corporate Investment: Reply, 55 REV. ECON. & STATS. 128 
(1973); see also William J. Baumol et al., Earnings Retention, New Capital and the Growth of the Firm, 52 
REV. ECON. & STATS. 345, 354-55 (1970) (showing firms that issued little new equity and had returns on 
reinvestment of retained earnings that approached zero). 
 40. See Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 
325, 336 (1995) (stating that “managers may prefer to lobby for other tax measures . . . that may be less 
advantageous to shareholders”). 
 41. See Richard A. Lambert et al., The Structure of Organizational Incentives, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 438, 
441-42 (1993) (empirically verifying the ability of many CEOs to inflate their own compensation); Rudiger 
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to reward loyal underlings with promotions.42 An egregious aspect of this “empire 
building” is unprofitable acquisitions: on average, purchasers realize no profit from 
acquisitions.43 Finally, corporations deploy takeover defenses despite the damage they do 
to share values. The harm from staggered boards and poison pills has been 
documented.44 In general, managerial entrenchment is associated with lower firm value45 
and higher CEO compensation.46 Most firms retain their takeover defenses even when 
shareholders vote to request their removal.47
The foregoing claims are sometimes construed as a charge of managers’ bad faith; 
the alleged charge is then denied. Self-serving behavior does not necessarily stem from 
venality, though. Most people are optimistic and think well of themselves.48 Managers 
are no exception.49 Even when acting in good faith they are likely to exaggerate the 
benefits of growth and of their own value to the company. 
The most touted evidence of persistent problems with corporate governance is the 
Fahlenbrach, Shareholder Rights and CEO Compensation (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper 
03-05, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=390144 (demonstrating that weak shareholder rights 
correlate with higher CEO compensation and faster increases in CEO compensation). 
 42. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 383-85 (4th ed. 1977); 
GORDON DONALDSON, MANAGING CORPORATE WEALTH: THE OPERATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE FINANCIAL 
GOALS SYSTEM 37 (1984); OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS (1975); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 43. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 614 n.5 (2002) (stating that 
“studies of acquiring companies stock performance report results ranging from no statistically significant stock 
price effect to statistically significant losses” (citation omitted)); RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, 
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 300-02 (2d ed. 1995). Further, “[a]cquiring firms appear 
to suffer negative abnormal returns in the several years following the transaction.” Id. at 309. 
 44. See Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 430 
(2005) (finding that staggered boards are associated with significantly reduced firm value). See generally 
Lucian Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 713 (2003); Kenneth A. 
Borokhovich, et al., CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments, 52 J. FIN. 1495 (1997) (showing that 
takeover defenses are associated with higher subsequent agency costs and poor performance). 
 45. Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance? (Harvard Law Sch. John M. 
Olin Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 491, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=593423 (showing that a six-
factor entrenchment index is associated with significantly lower firm value). 
 46. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 30, at 85-86. See also Marianne  Bertrand & Sendhil Mallainathan, Is 
There Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using Takeover Legislation, 30 RAND. J. ECON. 535  (1999); Paul 
Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 144-45 (2003). 
 47. In 2003, 84 shareholder proposals seeking rescission of, or shareholder approval for, poison pills came 
to a vote; 63 received majority support. In 2004, as of October 29, 48 such proposals had come to a vote; 41 
received majority support. Andrew R. Brownstein & Igor Kirman, Can a Board Say No When Shareholders Say 
Yes? Responding to Majority Vote Resolutions, 60 BUS. LAW. 23, 26-27 (2004). 
 48. See generally CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds. 2000); 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al., eds. 2002); 
Simon Gervais & Terence Odean, Learning To Be Overconfident, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 1 (2001); J.B. Heaton, 
Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 FIN. MGMT. 33 (2002); Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, 
CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment, 60 J. FIN. 2661 (2005); Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis 
of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197 (1986). 
 49. See generally Laurie Larwood & William Whittaker, Managerial Myopia: Self-Serving Biases in 
Organizational Planning, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 194 (1977); James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial 
Perspectives on Risk and Risk-Taking, 33 MGMT. SCI. 324 (1987).  
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spate of corporate scandals that exploded early in this decade: Enron,50 WorldCom, 
Tyco, Adelphia, and ImClone. Defenders of the status quo treat these disasters as 
aberrations, not evidence of need for general corporate reform. However, the governance 
of the companies rocked by scandals does not seem to have been atypical. In both the 
composition and operation of their boards they seem to have followed the accepted “best 
practices.”51
In sum, there is overwhelming evidence that managers of public companies often 
can and do obtain corporate action that inures to their benefit and to the detriment of 
shareholders. Moreover, although it is impossible to quantify shareholder rights precisely, 
they seem to have diminished since 1985.52
C. The Failure of Past Reforms: The Monitoring Model and the “Independent” Board 
This state of affairs exposes the failure of past reforms. For over 20 years champions 
of greater corporate accountability to shareholders have succeeded in instituting rules and 
instilling attitudes in favor of corporate boards dominated by outside and independent 
directors. SEC rules require each company to disclose whether its directors are 
independent and whether its board has various oversight committees with majorities of 
independent directors.53 Further, rules of the NYSE and NASDAQ now demand some 
elements of director independence.54 As a result, most large public companies now have 
independent majorities on the full board and on standard oversight committees. 
However, these changes have not produced greater accountability to shareholders. 
Numerous studies have failed to detect any positive correlation between board 
independence and corporate financial performance;55 one study actually found a negative 
 50. For descriptions of the events at Enron, see Jeffrey D. Van Niel, Enron—The Primer, in CORPORATE 
FIASCOES, supra note 28, at 3. For discussion of the legal implications of Enron, see generally CORPORATE 
FIASCOES; AFTERSHOCK: THE PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FROM THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON AND OTHER MAJOR 
CORPORATIONS (Christopher L. Cull & William A. Niskanen eds., 2002). See also William W. Bratton, Enron 
and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002); John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused 
Enron: A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2004). 
 51. See REARDON, supra note 21, at 71-72 (stating that under widely accepted criteria Enron had excellent 
outside directors); Bratton, supra note 50, at 1333-34 (stating that Enron’s board followed widely accepted 
“best practices”); Paredes, supra note 28, at 504-05 (“[T]he Enron board was on the scene and, for the most 
part, taking most of the steps we ask a board to take”). Enron’s directors also owned substantial amounts of its 
stock. Outside directors on the audit committee owned on average 18,000 shares each. At Enron’s peak share 
price of about $83, 18,000 shares were worth over $1,500,000. See Yaniv Grinstein, Complementary 
Perspectives on “Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron,” 89 CORNELL L. REV. 503, 507-
08 (2004) (providing share ownership figures from Enron’s 2001 proxy statement). 
 52. See Henry Huang, Shareholder Rights and the Cost of Equity Capital 3 (Aug. 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) (stating that “the last two decades have witnessed a trend of restricting 
shareholder rights at the firm level in the U.S.”). An index of shareholder rights comprising 24 factors has been 
constructed in Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003). 
 53. See SEC Regulation S-K, Items 401(a),(d), 404(a),(b), 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.401(a),(d), 404(a),(b) (2005). 
 54. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 55. See Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43, 63-64 (2003) 
(discussing empirical literature); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board 
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999); David F. Larcker et al., How Important Is 
Corporate Governance? (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=595821 
(finding little correlation between corporate performance and several common measures of corporate 
governance quality); Kaufman et al., supra note 19, at 8 (stating that after some point a greater number of 
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correlation. Many directors still have “soft” conflicts of interest despite tightening 
definitions of “independence.”56 When Michael Ovitz asked whether the Disney board 
would approve the lavish contract that CEO Michael Eisner proposed for him, “Eisner 
laughed, ticking off the various ways that board members were beholden to him, and 
assuring Ovitz that they would do what he wanted.”57 And while rules defining 
independence may be too porous, allowing many conflicts of interest to seep through, 
they may also be too tight in some ways, barring the best candidates because of relatively 
minor affiliations.58
The lack of progress in corporate governance despite the growing number of 
independent directors persuaded some that reforms just had not gone far enough. 
Accordingly, definitions of “independence” were repeatedly tightened and requirements 
for board independence repeatedly ratcheted up. This effort has continued with the 
imposition of new requirements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.59 Some argue for further 
steps in this direction.60 Others oppose further reform now so that the recent changes 
have time to work.61
This approach is doomed to fail. The fatal flaw is that “independence” can be 
defined only as absence of affiliation between a director and corporate management. No 
definition or rule can make directors act zealously for shareholders,62 and in current 
outside directors is associated with reduced firm performance); Roberta Romano, Corporate Law and 
Corporate Governance, 5 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 277, 284-90 (1996). See also Alton B. Harris & Andrea S. 
Kramer, Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE AFTERSHOCK: THE PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FROM THE 
COLLAPSE OF ENRON AND OTHER MAJOR CORPORATIONS 49, 76 (Christopher L. Culp & William A. Niskanen 
eds., 2002) (stating that repeated increases in board independence have not worked). 
 56. See Paredes, supra note 28, at 510-11 (noting that independence is sometimes undermined by 
corporate charitable contributions to an institution with which a director is affiliated, consulting and other 
business arrangements between the company and its directors, or personal and social ties). For example, even 
remote links in board membership between a CEO and outside directors are associated with higher 
compensation for the CEO. David F. Larcker et al., Back Door Links Between Directors and Executive 
Compensation (Feb. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=671063. Such soft 
conflicts seem to have existed at firms recently rocked by scandals. See DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE 
BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM 164-65 
(2005). See generally Eliezer M. Fich & Lawrence J. White, CEO Compensation and Turnover: The Effects of 
Mutually Interlocked Boards, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 935 (2003). 
 57. James B. Stewart, Partners: Eisner, Ovitz, and the Disney Wars, NEW YORKER, Jan. 10, 2005, at 46, 
48. 
 58. For example, SOX treats Warren Buffett as a “conflicted” member of the audit committee of the board 
of Coca-Cola, Inc. because he controls companies that do business with Coke. See Edward Iwata, Businesses 
Say Corporate Governance Can Go Too Far, USA TODAY, June 24, 2004, at 1B. 
 59. See Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.  
 60. See Paredes, supra note 28, at 522 (“[T]here are still gaps in the tightened definition of independence 
in Sarbanes-Oxley.”); J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of 
Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 376-79 (2004) (proposing tighter federal regulation of self-dealing 
and a federal mandate for independent nominating committees). 
 61. See Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea 
Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67, 89-90 (2003) (“[I]t seems only prudent to take the time to assess 
the impact of the far-reaching reforms that have just been adopted.”); Task Force on S’holder Proposals of the 
Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sec., Section of Bus. Law of the Am. Bar Ass’n, Report on Proposed Changes in Proxy 
Rules and Regulations Regarding Procedures for the Election of Corporate Directors, 59 BUS. LAW. 109 
(2003) [hereinafter ABA Task Force Report] (semble). 
 62. See MACAVOY & MILLSTEIN, supra note 12, at 33 (stating that lack of affiliation is not enough to 
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circumstances they are unlikely to do so. “Independent” directors cannot know the firm 
as insiders do. They rarely own much company stock, so they have little personal stake in 
the stock’s value. To quarrel with management is unpleasant. Going along with the CEO 
and ignoring share value has no disagreeable consequences, and management has more 
influence than shareholders over the outside directors’ renomination and reelection. 
Similarly, tackling managerial self-dealing with prohibitions is inevitably flawed 
because definitions of self-dealing are always both under-inclusive and over-inclusive. 
As an example of the latter, SOX forbids companies to make loans to executives,63 but 
loans can be a useful element of compensation. Moreover, SOX has had some absurd 
consequences. For example, the ban on loans literally bars advances of travel expenses. 
Likewise, although takeover defenses are now harmful to shareholders,64 to ban all 
shark repellants would be unwise. If directors were truly independent and competent, 
poison pills might give them time to seek higher bids. Some form of job protection for 
executives may also benefit shareholders.65 To get effective boards we need a new 
approach that gives directors incentives to be zealous and the discretion to adopt wise 
policies. 
D. Support for Managerial Domination 
1. Traditional Managerialism 
Some applaud the separation of ownership and control. In the 1930s Merrick Dodd 
argued that corporations should serve the public as well as shareholders; accordingly, 
managers should have discretion to serve the interests of other constituencies and not be 
beholden to investors alone.66 As Berle and Means showed, managerialism was an 
accurate model of how corporate governance actually worked, but its normative appeal 
was always limited. In response to Dodd, Berle criticized the lack of accountability of 
managers in the managerialist model. It was unwise, he insisted, to grant managers 
immense power with little constraint beyond a “pious wish” that something good come of 
assure good director performance); Bebchuk, supra note 55, at 49 (“[I]ndependence of directors from the firm’s 
executives does not imply that the directors are dependent on shareholders or otherwise induced to focus solely 
on shareholder interests.”); Bratton, supra note 50, at 1334 (stating that no standard of independence can 
guarantee effective effort by directors); Enriques, supra note 20, at 927 (arguing that “no definition of 
independence will ever assure that an independent director will indeed act as such”); Pozen, supra note 16, at 
98-99 (stating that “formal affiliation to the company“ is not what determines the quality of a director). 
 63. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §402, 116 Stat. 745. 
 64. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 65. See Sudheer Chava et al., Do Shareholder Rights Affect the Cost of Bank Loans? (European Fin. 
Ass’n, 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 5061, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=495853 
(showing that weak shareholder rights are associated with lower interests rates on bank loans); John E. Core et 
al., Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and 
Investors’ Expectations, 61 J. FIN. 655 (2006) (showing that shareholders may benefit from job protections for 
executives). 
 66. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). 
See also Gordon Donaldson, Financial Goals: Management vs. Stockholders, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 
1963, at 116; Bayless Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1477 (1958) (reviewing J.A. LIVINGSTON, 
THE AMERICAN STOCK HOLDER (1952)). 
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it.67 Even the American Law Institute eventually embraced the view that the goal of 
corporate governance was “enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”68
2. The Team Production (or Mediating) Model 
A modern variation on managerialism is the team production (or mediating) model 
of corporate governance.69 It is sometimes called the director primacy model,70 but this 
label is misleading because directors as such do not, and probably cannot, exercise much 
control.71 Like the old managerialists, team production theorists argue that boards should 
mediate among the corporation’s various constituencies.72 However, the old 
managerialism stemmed from socio-political concerns: it favored managerial control in 
order to achieve a socially desirable division between shareholders and other 
constituencies of the benefits flowing from the corporation. The team production model 
places more weight on economics. 
First, team production theory posits that corporations need non-shareholder 
constituencies (often called “stakeholders”)73 to make commitments that would expose 
them to exploitation by shareholder dominated boards.74 Unlike shareholders, 
stakeholders are not diversified; if mistreated, they cannot simply withdraw their 
commitments as shareholders can by selling their stock.75 Accordingly, these 
stakeholders need protection through a corporate governance system that leaves directors 
broad discretion rather than slavishly pursuing the goal of maximization of share value. 
In fact, stakeholders need not fear exploitation by shareholders. Both shareholders 
and stakeholders generally benefit from the maximization of share price. The most 
profitable companies tend to offer the best employee compensation and opportunities for 
promotion.76 And firms that “contract with their stakeholders on the basis of mutual trust 
 67. Adolph A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 
1368 (1932). 
 68. AM. LAW INST., supra note 5, § 2.01. 
 69. Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm, in EMPLOYEES AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 58, 87 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999) (discussing the need to protect 
the firm from predation by any constituency); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory 
of Corporate Governance, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Kaufman et al., supra note 19.  
 70. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003). 
 71. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text. 
 72. See Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive 
Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 715 (2004) (referring to directors as “mediating hierarchs”). 
 73. The very definition of the term is problematic. See R. Edward Freeman et al., Stakeholder Theory and 
“The Corporate Objective Revisited,” 15 ORG. SCI. 364, 365 (2002) (“[S]takeholder theory can be many things 
to many people.”); Ronald K. Mitchell et al., Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: 
Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 853 (1997) (finding 27 different 
definitions of “stakeholder”). 
 74. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 75. Interestingly, the frequent claim of team production theorists that shareholders are less vulnerable than 
other stakeholders—because they can withdraw their investment in the company by selling their stock—is 
contradicted by some team production theorists who defend the corporate form (including the separation of 
ownership and control) on the ground that it locks in shareholders by preventing them from withdrawing their 
capital without board action. See infra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 76. See Olubunmi Faleye et al., When Labor Has a Voice in Corporate Governance (Nat’l Bureau of 
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and cooperation . . . will have a competitive advantage.”77 To mistreat employees, 
customers, or suppliers would be to impair the shareholders’ own interests.78 If such 
exploitation did result from shareholder control, we would see evidence of it after 
takeovers. However, blue collar employment and wages do not decline after takeovers.79
Some team production theorists concede that in both the team production and the 
shareholder primacy models the goal of corporate governance is the same: to maximize 
firm value.80 The only difference is semantic, but “language matters” because it sends 
“social signals” that induce essential cooperation from stakeholders and also enhance the 
ethics of team members.81 It seems doubtful that language matters enough to warrant the 
major differences in the locus of corporate control that the two theories posit. More 
important, this analysis begs the question of why shareholders and (manager-dominated) 
boards clash over executive compensation and disposition of free cash flow. Clearly, 
investors dislike the status quo defended by team production theorists in ways that go 
beyond rhetoric. 
Contrary to team production theory, shareholders have more reason to fear 
exploitation than do employees and other stakeholders. Employees have contracts 
specifying their compensation. True, employees make a commitment to the firm that can 
reduce the value of their human capital (i.e., their labor) outside the firm, thus exposing 
themselves to opportunism.82 However, most employees retain substantial market value 
for their labor. Indeed, the job skills they acquire often enhance their market value. That 
is why employers often need non-competition clauses to limit the freedom of employees 
to switch jobs.83 Even workers who lack a better alternative opportunity are not 
defenseless; they can simply slacken in their work. All employers know that a sullen and 
resentful workforce is less productive and profitable. 
Suppliers, customers, and lenders also have ample protections from exploitation. 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W11254, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=697179 (stating that 
labor-controlled public firms grow more slowly and create fewer new jobs than other public firms). See 
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 43, at 420-21 (stating that “pursuit of shareholder wealth maximization often redounds 
to the benefit of nonshareholder constituencies” and that in a hypothetical bargain among all corporate 
stakeholders “we would expect a bargain to be struck in which shareholder wealth maximization is the chosen 
norm”). 
 77. Anant K. Sundaram & Andrew C. Inkpen, The Corporate Objective Revisited, 15 ORG. SCI. 350, 353 
(2002). 
 78. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA 
L. REV. 811, 863 (1992) (“In the long run, shareholders can’t systematically exploit other ‘stakeholders’ in the 
corporate enterprise” because doing so would damage the shareholders’ own interests.). 
 79. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 43, at 625 (citing studies showing that “wages and employment of 
blue collar workers in plants subject to takeovers declined relative to non-takeover plants prior to the takeover, 
but grew more quickly after the takeover”). White collar employment may decline after takeovers. See id. 
However, this is probably a result not of mistreatment by the acquirer but of overstaffing as part of the empire 
building of pre-acquisition management. 
 80. Margaret M. Blair, Directors’ Duties in a Post-Enron World: Why Language Matters, 38 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 885, 900 (2003). 
 81. Id. at 900-08. 
 82. See Kaufman et al., supra note 19, at 13 (noting that since “each member’s skills remain valuable only 
within the context of the team (and the firm and industry), individuals cannot threaten to quit and join another 
effort”). 
 83. See 2 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 13.4 (2005) (discussing the use of covenants by 
employees not to compete so as to protect the employer from a diversion of confidential information). 
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Suppliers and customers can demand contractual protection and simply refuse to deal 
with a company that behaves improperly. Suppliers can also charge more for their inputs. 
Both can injure a company’s reputation—a crucial asset for most firms—by public 
criticism. Lenders (at least of private debt) insist on “elaborate covenants that give them a 
large role in the affairs of the corporation.”84
Shareholders’ exposure is much greater. They have no contractual right to fixed 
payouts; they get only the residue (if any) that those in control generate and deign to 
distribute. Only stockholders have “the perspective of the aggregate.”85 Moreover, the 
shareholders’ input is complete once they buy the firm’s stock. An employee can 
withdraw her input by quitting the firm, but shareholders can’t withdraw their capital.86 
That is why equity owners alone elect the firm’s directors. If the team production model 
was valid, employees and perhaps other stakeholders would share that right either by 
statute or by contract. In fact, they do not. 
Team production theory also maintains that shareholders tie their own hands by 
ceding control to autonomous boards of directors in order to assure other constituencies 
that they will not be exploited.87 This is far-fetched. If ceding control were necessary to 
corporate success, companies with controlling shareholders would not be viable unless 
those shareholders renounced control and walled themselves off from takeover bids with 
poison pills. That does not happen. Shareholders who own enough shares to exercise 
control do so.88
Neither do public shareholders voluntarily forswear influence. In particular, they 
actively fight antitakeover provisions. Team production theorists deny that this behavior 
belies their claims. They argue that investors welcome poison pills and other “shark 
repellants” when companies go public.89 Efforts to remove antitakeover devices, they 
 84. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate 
Governance 1 (Vanderbilt Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 05-08, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=692023. See also id. at 8 (“These loan agreements define defaults in ways that give 
creditors as much control over the board and its decisions as shareholders.”). 
 85. Bayless Manning, Thinking Straight About Corporate Law Reform, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 
20-23 (1977). See also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 43, at 469-70. “[S]hareholders are the only corporate 
constituency with a residual, unfixed, ex post claim on corporate assets and earnings.” Therefore, “shareholders 
have the strongest economic incentive to care about the size of the residual claim, which means that they have 
the greatest incentive to elect directors committed to maximizing firm profitability.” Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 86. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 43, at 471 (stating that “job mobility” gives some protection to 
employees). An individual shareholder or the body of shareholders can disinvest by selling their stock to 
another investor, but the price paid reflects the purchaser’s expectations of future payouts. More important, 
neither individual nor aggregate sales of stock withdraw capital from the company; they simply change the 
identity of the stockholders. 
 87. See Bainbridge, supra note 70, at 547 (stating that shareholders realize that corporate governance 
would suffer if they exerted control); Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on 
Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 685-86 (2003). 
Some who do not espouse the team production theory still share its views about the role of the board. See 
Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 61, at 79 (trumpeting “the need to have a body that balances a wide array of 
competing interests, both among the shareholders themselves and between shareholders and other 
constituencies”). 
 88. Institutional investors, especially hedge funds, are increasingly demanding board representation on 
public companies. See Mara Der Hovanesian, Attack of the Hungry Hedge Funds, BUS. WK., Feb. 20, 2006, at 
72. 
 89. See Stout, supra note 87, at 698-702. 
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claim, are simply attempts to renege on the promises implicitly made to other 
stakeholders.90 If this thesis were true, shareholders would attack poison pills only after a 
takeover bid is made. To rescind a pill sooner would cause stakeholders to abandon their 
commitment to the firm, thereby damaging the firm’s share price. In fact, though, 
investors do battle poison pills even when there is no bid. When they succeed, share price 
does not fall, and I know of no evidence that rescission causes stakeholders to reduce 
their commitment to the firm. Investors have reasons to oppose antitakeover provisions 
apart from exploitation of stakeholders. Companies with strong antitakeover provisions 
are, for example, more likely to make unprofitable acquisitions.91
It is also argued that shareholders tie their own hands in order to avoid fighting 
among themselves over their conflicting interests and goals. This too is wrong; in fact, 
the interests of shareholders are remarkably uniform.92 Claims that investors promote 
detrimental “short-termism” are also ill-founded.93 A powerful shareholder presence is 
actually associated with better corporate financial performance in several respects.94 
Others maintain that institutional investors lack incentives to seek influence in corporate 
governance.95 However, investors value shareholder rights, as evidenced by the impact 
of these rights on share prices.96 These claims are further belied by the increasing 
 90. Id. at 705. 
 91. See Ronald W. Masulis et al., Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns (European Corporate 
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 116/2006, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=697501 (reporting 
an empirical study); see also supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing damage from takeover defenses). 
 92. See infra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 93. See Ronald J. Gilson, Separation and the Function of Corporate Law 9-10 (Stanford Law & Econ. 
Olin Working Paper No. 307, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=732832 (“[C]ompetition among 
investors who do not suffer from a short-term bias will drive stock price toward an unbiased level.”). 
 94. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATE FINANCE 237-38 (1994) (stating that the presence of large block holders often improves corporate 
performance); Paul Gompers & Andrew Metrick, Institutional Investors and Equity Prices, 116 Q.J. ECON. 229 
(2001) (finding higher stock returns for companies with large institutional ownership); Thomas Moeller, Let’s 
Make a Deal: How Shareholder Control Impacts Merger Payoffs, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 167, 167 (2005) (presenting 
study showing that “the presence of large outside blockholders . . . is positively correlated with takeover 
premiums”);  Robert Daines et al., supra note 33 (showing that firms with large shareholders and high incentive 
pay tend to perform better); ROE, supra (stating that the available evidence strongly suggests that institutional 
investors are not systematically myopic; investors react favorably to increased firm spending on research and 
development, and institutional investors hold more than their pro rata share of stocks of R&D-intensive firms). 
On the other hand, antitakeover devices and other indicia of management entrenchment are associated with poor 
corporate performance. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Is There Discretion in Wage Setting? A 
Test Using Takeover Legislation, 30 RAND J. ECON. 535 (1999) (showing that stringent antitakeover laws 
weaken managements’ incentive to control labor costs); Core et al., supra note 65 (describing a study finding 
that firms with stronger antitakeover provisions have poorer operating performance); Gerald T. Garvey & 
Gordon Hanka, Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm 
Leverage, 54 J. FIN. 519, 520 (1999) (stating that antitakeover laws “allow managers to pursue goals other than 
maximizing shareholder wealth”); Masulis et al., supra note 91 (study showing negative correlation between the 
strength of a firm’s antitakeover provisions and profitability of its acquisitions). 
 95. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 22, at 866 (claiming that diversified investors care only about 
their total portfolios, not about individual companies); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) 
Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 474 (1991) (arguing that index funds 
compete by powering costs and therefore avoid the costs of participating in corporate governance). 
 96. See Huang, supra note 52, at 29 (presenting a study showing that “the level of shareholder rights is 
significantly associated with the cost of equity capital. Investors perceive the weak shareholder rights as an 
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activism of institutional investors and the growing support for shareholder proposals to 
limit antitakeover devices.97 The activism of institutional investors, though limited, is 
impressive given the many obstacles it encounters. First, assertive shareholders can 
provoke CEOs who are jealous of their power and can punish unruly institutions.98 
Second, activism incurs out-of-pocket costs. Since even huge institutions typically own 
an infinitesimal fraction of the portfolio company’s stock, the institutions can hope to 
cover these costs by increasing the value of the portfolio company’s stock only on 
matters of exceptional financial importance.99
The law further hinders shareholder participation in corporate governance. The 
federal proxy rules treat anything more than de minimis contacts among shareholders as 
proxy solicitations,100 which require a filing with the SEC and detailed disclosures.101 
Shareholders who collaborate may incur further duties and liabilities. If they own an 
aggregate of more than 5% of a company’s stock, they may be deemed to be “act[ing] as 
a . . . group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities” of the 
company102 and therefore required to file disclosure documents with the SEC.103 They 
may also become subject to liability as “controlling persons”104 or as “insiders.”105 They 
important source of potential agency costs and demand higher rates of return accordingly.”). See also Core et 
al., supra note 65 (showing that analysts weigh shareholder rights in making earnings forecasts). 
 97. See Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals Post-Enron: What’s Changed, 
What’s the Same? (Vanderbilt Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 05-30, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=868652 (documenting growing support for shareholder proposals, especially those 
opposing antitakeover devices). 
 98. For example, the CEO can withhold information and management fees for the company’s pension plan 
from disfavored institutions. See Pozen, supra note 16, at 97; see also Bernard Black, Agents Watching Agents: 
The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 826 (1992) (stating that money managers 
that vote against management “are likely to lose any business that they conduct with the company”); Gerald F. 
Davis & E. Han Kim, Would Mutual Funds Bite the Hand That Feeds Them? Business Ties and Proxy Voting 
(Feb. 15, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=667625 (presenting study 
showing that mutual funds that manage a large volume of pension funds are less likely to vote against 
management). 
 99. See Pozen, supra note 16, at 96-97 (detailing costs of shareholder activism to investors in terms of 
money and managerial time). 
 100. SEC rule 14a-1(l)(1)(iii) defines “solicitation” to include any “communication to security holders 
under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy.” 
17 C.F.R § 240.14-a1(l)(1)(iii) (2005). There are several exemptions, including Rule 14a-2(b)(2): “any 
solicitation made otherwise than on behalf of the registrant where the total number of persons solicited is not 
more than ten.” Id. § 240.14-a2(b)(2). 
 101. Id. § 240.14a-4 (prescribing the form of proxies); id. § 240.14a-6 (prescribing filing requirements). See 
Bernard Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 536-56 (1990) (discussing burdens 
of proxy rules on shareholder communications); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 22, at 894 (semble); ROE, 
supra note 94, at 274 (semble). 
 102. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d)(3) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (2000)). 
 103. Id. § 13(d)(1) (requiring initial filing); id. § 13(d)(2) (requiring additional filings “[i]f any material 
change occurs in the facts set forth in the [previously filed] statements”). 
 104. Securities Act of 1933 ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74, § 15, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77o (2000)); 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t (2000)). 
 105. Securities Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000) (imposing liability for short-swing trading 
profits by insiders); and Securities Exchange Act § 20A, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(A) (2000); id. § 21A, 15 U.S.C. § 
78u(A) (2000); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.10b5-1, 240.10b5-2 (2005) (forbidding trading by insiders on 
material non-public information). 
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can also trigger disabilities and liability under poison pills and state antitakeover laws.106 
Nonetheless, there is evidence that, when it occurs, shareholder activism is beneficial to 
firm performance.107
Other Pollyannas make the contradictory claim that investors are content because 
they already have ample power.108 This claim is also false, as demonstrated by the 
support of investors for proposed SEC rule 14a-11.109 Proxy fights for control are rare, 
especially in larger public companies.110 Defenders of the status quo also argue that 
investors have no cause for complaint because if they are dissatisfied with management 
of a firm they can sell its stock.111 The sale price, however, reflects the quality of 
management. If management is poor, the investor will get a low price. 
To the extent that investors accede to management domination it less likely reflects 
a calculation of their own interests than a concession to the awkwardness and futility of 
seeking fundamental change. Again, even minor increases in shareholder influence have 
been hard to obtain, impossible except in times of public outcry triggered by a corporate 
crisis. Further, although investors do not identify with managers, they do both play in the 
same business game, a game with age-old rules. To seek more than minor changes in 
these rules is frowned upon by all the competing teams in this league. Indeed, it is always 
hard even to think about fundamental changes in habits that have acquired a thick patina 
of tradition over decades or centuries. 
Team production theory champions the “director primacy” of an independent board, 
but independent directors do not dominate corporate boards now and never have.112 
When managers dominate boards, the team production theory is unworkable. Team 
production theorists posit that directors will behave altruistically.113 However, there is no 
reason to think that managers would exert their power for the benefit of constituencies 
other than themselves, and there is no empirical evidence that they do so.114 Team 
 106. See Black, supra note 101, at 550-51, 556-59. 
 107. See Christopher Palmeri, Meet the Friendly Corporate Raiders, BUS. WK., Sept. 20, 2004, at 102 
(describing the success of the Relational Investing fund in pressuring underperforming companies to improve). 
 108. See Robert D. Rosenbaum, Foundations of Sand: The Weak Premises Underlying the Current Push for 
Proxy Rule Changes, 17 J. CORP. L. 163, 165 (1991) (stating that “the proxy voting system already provides 
shareholders with an effective voice in corporate governance”); Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 61, at 92-94 
(semble); see also RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A SAVIOR: THE IRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC 
CEOS xii-xiii (2002) (claiming that institutional investors have excessive power and use that power to saddle 
CEOs with “unreasonable expectations” then firing them when they “fail to meet such extravagant 
expectations”). 
 109. See Roberta Karmel, Should a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional Directors?, 60 
BUS. LAW. 1, 10-11 (2004); infra notes 141-157 and accompanying text (discussing proposed rule 14a-11). 
 110. See Bebchuk, supra note 55, at 45-46 (concluding that in a seven-year period only about 80 companies 
had proxy fights for control, and only 10 of those had market capitalization over $200 million); Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, The Myth of Shareholder Franchise 7-14 (Oct. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=829804. 
 111. See Letter from Henry A. McKinell, Chairman, Bus. Roundtable, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary., Sec. & 
Exchange Comm. (Dec. 22, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/brt122203.htm. 
 112. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 113. See Licht, supra note 72, at 715 (positing that people’s conduct is “altruistic” in accordance with the 
principle of “fairness”). 
 114. Berle and Means recognized this danger. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Bebchuk, 
supra note 55, at 59 (“[T]here is no reason to think that reduced accountability to shareholders would translate 
into increased attention to stakeholders . . . . The interests of directors and executives are even less aligned with 
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production theorists have offered no technique for producing a board that truly would be 
independent. Past corporate governance movements dedicated to other constituencies or 
to the “public interest” have foundered on the same rock.115 The problem is particularly 
acute because the interests of other constituencies conflict.116 Even if some method could 
guarantee director independence, directors might not exercise their discretion for the 
benefit of non-shareholder constituencies; they might act for their own benefit.117 Until 
this problem is resolved, the team production theory and related models are untenable; 
shareholder primacy and managerial control are the only options realistically available. 
Another claim of team production theorists (shared with many defenders of the 
corporate establishment) is that many, if not most, shareholders value short-term profits 
over maximization of long-term share value.118 Recognizing this reality, the law 
confirms the weak role of shareholders in corporate governance by making it difficult for 
them to influence elections to the board or to hold directors liable for actions the 
shareholders dislike.119 In fact, however, there is no empirical evidence that myopic 
shareholder short-termism is “of significant magnitude.”120 Some investors do stress 
short-term corporate performance; some investors also focus on astrology or pester 
managers about obscure social causes. There is no evidence that these groups are more 
than a small minority with little power. 
Critics charge that many investors seek a “short-term pop in the company’s share 
price,”121 so that they can bail out before markets realize the firm’s long-term 
weaknesses. This claim rests on several dubious premises. First, it assumes that securities 
markets focus on short-term performance. If that were so, it should be easy for rational 
the interest of stakeholders than they are aligned with the interests of shareholders.”); Giovanni Cespa & 
Giacinta Cestone, Stakeholder Activism, Managerial Entrenchment, and the Congruence of Interests Between 
Shareholders and Stakeholders (Universitat Pomper Fabra Econ. & Bus. Working Paper No. 634, 2002), 
available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=394300; EISENBERG, supra note 5, at 19 (“[I]t is only the shareholders’ 
role that prevents . . . a de jure self-perpetuating oligarchy.”). For evidence of the self-serving use of managers’ 
power, see supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. 
 115. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 688-90 (1986) (stating that “social responsibility” 
advocates have been vague about goals and inconsistent about means); Berle, supra note 67, at 1367; William 
W. Bratton, Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 59, 73-74 (2005) 
(stating that past and present critics of shareholder primacy “have never managed to produce an alternative 
model that surmounts coherence objections and resonates in the context of our social settlement”). 
 116. See Sundaram & Inkpen, supra note 77, at 354. They also do not need a voice on the board because 
their interests are protected by contract while those of shareholders are not. See id. at 355-56. 
 117. See Millon, supra note 14, at 1042; see also Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View of Fiduciary Duties, 43 
U. TORONTO L.J. 299, 303 (1993) (stating that a requirement that management consider all constituencies “[i]s 
essentially vacuous, because it allows management to justify almost any action on the grounds that it benefits 
some group”); Licht, supra note 72, at 707 (semble). 
 118. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 61, at 78 (Some investors “may seek to push the corporation into 
steps designed to create a short-term pop in the company’s share price.”); Eduard Gracia, Corporate Short-Term 
Thinking and the Winner-Take-All Market (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=445260; Harvard Symposium on Corporate Elections, supra note 2, at 8 (comments of 
Martin Lipton) (stating that shareholders pressure managers to maximize quarterly earnings and to exaggerate 
reported earnings); Rosenbaum, supra note 108, at 178 (“[M]ost money managers have an interest in short-term 
gains, even at the expense of broader or longer term values.”). 
 119. See Stout, supra note 87, at 692-94. 
 120. Symposium on Corporate Elections, supra note 2 (comments of Lucian Bebchuk). 
 121. See Lipton & Rosenbaum, supra note 61, at 78. 
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investors to identify stocks that are over- or under-priced; that does not seem to be the 
case.122 Second, it assumes that investors who pressure managers to accentuate the short 
term plan and are able to bail out before the short-term bubble bursts, which in turn 
assumes that they know something the rest of the market does not know. No evidence has 
been offered to support either assumption. Finally, this hypothesis assumes that after 
these “short-termers” bail out of an overpriced stock they can identify and purchase other 
stocks that are not overpriced, which in turn assumes that the “short-termers” can 
consistently outperform the market. Again, no evidence is offered to support these 
assumptions. 
When shareholders do focus on quarterly earnings, it is more an effect than a cause 
of separation of ownership and control. People pay more attention to daily weather 
reports than to climate because they can adjust their plans to deal with the weather, but 
they can do little about climate. Similarly, some investors may stress the short term 
because they have so little influence over corporate strategy. Even if a firm’s long-term 
strategy succeeds, investors cannot be sure they will ever see the benefits; managers often 
fritter away profits on empire-building rather than increasing dividends.123
It is unnecessary, though, to refute completely allegations of shareholder short-
termism. The question is not whether shareholder attitudes and behavior are perfect, but 
whether investor control is better than any alternative. Of course, managers often charge 
that investors pressure them to stress the short term, and some may believe these claims, 
but that does not make the charges true. Indeed, if managers overemphasize the short 
term it may be for their own benefit, not to obey investor demands.124 Executives of a 
poorly performing firm may doctor their reports in order to deflect just criticism from 
directors and shareholders. In so doing they may also temporarily fool the securities 
markets, thereby enabling themselves to unload stock and options at inflated prices. Such 
behavior seems to have been common among executives of companies hit by the recent 
scandals.125 When the truth emerges, the stock price plummets. The executives may have 
bailed out of the stock, but public investors are stuck. They gain nothing from short-term 
hype unless they are tipped and also bail out; there is little evidence that this happens 
often. 
Short-termism could occur because “managers cannot transmit proprietary, complex, 
 122. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 43, at 135 (stating that a corollary of the semi-strong form of the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis is that “[y]ou can’t consistently beat the market by picking particular stocks 
that you think are undervalued”). 
 123. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; see also Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash 
Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 650 (1984) (arguing that waste of free cash flow 
helps explain the apparent under-pricing of shares of some public companies). 
 124. See Bratton, supra note 50, at 1328 (“Enron’s managers’ obsession with short-term numbers” 
stemmed in part from “Enron’s performance-based bonus scheme.”); Black, supra note 78, at 865 (“Managerial 
myopia is a serious concern.”); cf. Gracia, supra note 118 (ascribing short-termism to globalization and the 
intensifying competition of the “winner take all” market, not to shareholder pressures). 
 125. Managers manipulate the timing of disclosures to maximize their profits on stock options. See David 
Aboody & Ron Kasznik, CEO Stock Option Awards and the Timing of Corporate Voluntary Disclosures, 29 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 73 (2000); Keith Chauvin & Catherine Shenoy, Stock Price Decreases Prior to Executive Stock 
Option Grants, 7 J. CORP. FIN. 53 (2001); Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. 
SCI. 802 (2005); D. Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements, 
52 J. FIN. 449 (1997); see generally ROBERT H. TILLMAN & MICHAEL L. INDERGAARD, PUMP AND DUMP: THE 
RANCID RULES OF THE NEW ECONOMY (2005). 
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and technological information well to distant, atomized shareholders.”126 If so, however, 
“[t]he large shareholder would . . . protect managers from outsiders who would second-
guess truly profitable long-run investments.”127 Outside directors currently lack the 
credibility to reassure investors of the wisdom of management’s strategy. 
In sum, then, managers may seek artificially to boost share price temporarily or 
invest corporate funds in unprofitable empire-building for their own benefit. Outside 
directors typically own little stock, so they have little incentive to resist these managerial 
tendencies; they generally defer to management, especially in forming the firm’s business 
plan. The shareholders’ interest is to maximize (long-term) share price, which coincides 
with society’s interest in corporations.128
Some ascribe a more general irrationality to investors.129 True, investors are human 
beings, and humans are not perfectly rational. For that very reason, though, these attacks 
on shareholder primacy are attacks on a straw man. The question is not whether 
shareholder primacy is perfect, but whether there is a better alternative. As the current 
problems of corporate governance show, managerial primacy does not meet that test.130
Nor is there any theoretical basis or empirical evidence that shareholder influence 
inflicts the harm to other corporate constituencies that team production theory predicts. 
Investors appreciate that abusing other constituencies would rebound to the investors’ 
detriment. Indeed, “[o]nly residual cash flow claimants have the incentive to maximize 
the total value of the firm.”131 On average, employees are not harmed by leveraged 
buyouts or unsolicited takeovers, in which domination of the board typically passes from 
management to a controlling shareholder.132 In recognition of these facts, some team 
production theorists concede that their model differs from the shareholder primacy model 
only in its rhetoric.133 Simply weakening shareholders’ voice in choosing the board does 
 126. ROE, supra note 94, at 13. 
 127. Id. at 241. See also id. at 12-13, 244-45, 247. 
 128. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to 
Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of 
History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001) (“[T]here is convergence on a consensus that the best 
means to this end (that is, the pursuit of aggregate social welfare) is to make corporate managers strongly 
accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, only to those interests.”). In 1997 the Business 
Roundtable adopted this position after years of opposition to it. Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 3. Support for 
this conclusion is also growing outside the United States. See Paddy Ireland, Shareholder Primacy and the 
Distribution of Wealth, 68 MOD. L. REV. 49, 49-50 (2005). 
 129. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT 
MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000); Nicholas Barberis & Richard H. Thaler, A 
Survey of Behavioral Finance, in 1B HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1053, 1055 (George 
Constantinides et al. eds., 2003). 
 130. See supra Part III.B. 
 131. Sundaram & Inkpen, supra note 77, at 353. Other constituencies might favor “unrelated 
diversification” and be excessively risk averse. Id. at 354. But see Kaufman et al., supra note 19, at 15 (denying 
that shareholders “provide risk capital,” that their investments are “unprotected,” and that they “bear residual 
risk”). 
 132. See Ronald Daniels, Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism Be Compassionate?, 43 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 297, 317-25 (1993) (concluding that takeovers don’t harm stakeholders much, if at all); Roberta 
Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 133-43 (1992) 
(same). 
 133. See Blair, supra note 80; see also Freeman et al., supra note 73, at 366 (stating that there is no need to 
treat shareholder value and stakeholder value as “oppositional”). 
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nothing to assure that directors will pay any heed to stakeholders. Since most outsiders 
own little stock, they have little to lose if stakeholders are mistreated and leave the firm 
or render suboptimal performance. 
IV. RECENT AND PROPOSED REFORMS 
The enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and adoption of new stock exchange rules 
have not satisfied many critics of corporate governance. The SEC has proposed a rule to 
enhance shareholder influence in board elections, and many commentators have urged 
further reforms. None of these proposals is likely to be effective. 
A. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act  takes some useful steps. It will improve financial reporting 
and diminish the liquidity of executives’ stock.134 But SOX is no panacea. Its goals are 
quite modest, being limited primarily to deterring and catching illegal acts.135 It does not 
change rules for board composition or selection.136 Further, whatever benefits SOX 
generates come at substantial cost. There are out-of-pocket costs for the higher auditing 
fees necessitated by SOX’s new accounting requirements.137 SOX seems to be behind 
the recent sharp rise in the cost of D&O insurance.138 For large companies these costs 
may not be material, but they are large enough to persuade many smaller public 
companies to go private.139 It may also be causing many foreign companies to cease 
listing on American stock exchanges. In sum, SOX is not the solution to the corporate 
governance problem.140
 134. See Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 3, at 20. 
 135. Even there it is not likely to be very effective. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christina J. Johnson, 
Managerialism, Legal Ethics, and Sarbanes-Oxley § 307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 299. 
 136. See Brown, supra note 60, at 317-21, 338-49, 358-74. SOX also does not authorize shareholder suits; 
it can be enforced only by the SEC, which is already so busy that it cannot pursue many substantial claims. See 
MACAVOY & MILLSTEIN, supra note 12, at 105. 
 137. See Section 404 Costs Exceed Estimates, FEI Finds, Corp. Governance Rep. (BNA) 38 (Apr. 4, 2005) 
(reporting a study finding that for large public companies, costs of one year’s compliance with section 404 of 
SOX averaged $4.36 million, almost 40% more than these companies had estimated in July 2004); William J. 
Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of ‘Going Private’ 7 (Emory Law & Econ. 
Research Paper No. 05-4, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=672761 (documenting rising accounting 
costs imposed by SOX). 
 138. See id. at 6. But see Peter C. Hsu, Going Private—A Response to an Increased Regulatory Burden? 
(UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ. Research Paper No. 04-16, 2004) (offering a study showing that avoiding 
regulatory costs on public companies is not the primary motive for most going private transactions). 
 139. See Claudia H. Deutsch, The Higher Price of Staying Public, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2005, at 5 
(documenting the growing number of smaller public companies going private because of SOX); Carney, supra 
note 137 (discussing costs imposed by SOX and its effect of causing many companies to go private); Vidhi 
Chhaochharia & Yaniv Grinstein, Corporate Governance and Firm Value—The Impact of the 2002 Governance 
Rules (Dec. 2005) (unpublished manuscript from the American Finance Association’s 2006 Boston meetings), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=556990 (stating that share prices rose for big firms forced by SOX to make 
changes, but that prices of smaller public companies fell); James S. Linck et al., Effects and Unintended 
Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Corporate Boards (Aug. 31, 2005) (unpublished manuscript from 
the American Finance Association’s 2006 Boston meetings), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=687496. 
 140. See MACAVOY & MILLSTEIN, supra note 12, at 1; Brett H. McDonnell, Sarbanes-Oxley, Fiduciary 
Duties, and the Conduct of Officers and Directors 1 n.3 (Minn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 04-13, 2004), 
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B. Proposed SEC Rule 14a-11 
The SEC has proposed a new rule, 14a-11, which would allow certain shareholders 
to nominate one or two directors under certain circumstances.141 The first problem with 
rule 14a-11 as a fix for corporate governance is that it may never be adopted in its 
proposed form, if at all.142 The corporate establishment is solidly against it. It urges the 
SEC to delay action until the effects of Sarbanes-Oxley and other recent reforms can be 
gauged.143 It also charges that 14a-11 will result in the election of directors with special 
interests “that may conflict with the best interests of the public corporation and its 
shareholder body and other constituencies.”144 The institutional investors who back these 
directors may engage in self-dealing.145 The rule will impose substantial monetary costs, 
including expensive proxy fights.146 It will spawn tension and undermine cooperation 
between directors and managers.147 This tension and the unpleasantness of proxy fights 
will dissuade the best board candidates from serving.148 Increased pressure on CEOs and 
boards will make them excessively risk-averse.149 Although the Commission has made 
no final determination on the proposal, recent related acts do not bode well for 14a-11.150
These fears are overblown.151 The rule will allow substantial shareholders to 
nominate directors, but they must still be elected by the whole body of shareholders. The 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=570321; Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of 
Quack Corporate Governance (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 04-032, 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=596101.  
 141. Security Holder Direct or Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 
(proposed Oct. 23, 2003). 
 142. Patrick McGurn, executive vice president of Institutional Shareholder Services, says the proposal “not 
just looks dead, but it is dead.” ISS’s Proxy Season Preview Features New Voting Policy, 20 Corp. Counsel 
Weekly (BNA) 94 (Mar. 23, 2005). See also SEC Access Proposal Seen as Dead; Some Shift Focus to 
Requiring Majority Vote, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 230 (BNA) (Feb. 7, 2005). 
 143. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 61, at 69 (urging the SEC “to allow the reforms that have been 
adopted to have their effect”); ABA Task Force Report, supra note 61, at 119; Letter to the SEC from David M. 
Silk, Chairman, Task Force on Potential Changes to the Proxy Rules, Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York 
(June 13, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/tfpcprabny061303.htm (arguing for delay 
in any new rules on board elections “until the scope and effect of initiatives already implanted are fully 
understood”). 
 144. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 61, at 78. 
 145. See Stephen M Bainbridge, A Comment on the SEC Shareholder Access Proposal (UCLA Sch. of 
Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 03-22, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=470121. 
 146. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 61, at 111 (charging that proxy fights would be “disruptive, 
expensive and contrary to the best interests of publicly-owned companies and investors”); Bainbridge, supra 
note 25, at 21 (estimating the total costs of the rule at $100 million per year); Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 
61, at 83-85. 
 147. See Bainbridge, supra note 145, at 23; Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 61, at 67 (predicting 
“Balkanized, dysfunctional boards”); id. at 82-85. 
 148. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 61, at 120; Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 61, at 86 
(discussing why director recruiting has been more difficult in recent years). 
 149. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 61, at 86-87 (claiming that this is already happening because of 
recent reforms). 
 150. See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Rebuffs Investors on Board Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at C2 
(reporting that a decision by the SEC that three companies can refuse requests by shareholders to nominate a 
few candidates for board seats “was seen as an unambiguous sign that [proposed rule 14a-11] is dead”). 
 151. See Arthur Levitt, Let the Little Guy in the Boardroom, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2004, at A23 (arguing 
that “[t]he sky won’t fall” if investors are given the power to nominate directors). 
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latter have no reason to elect directors who engage in self-dealing or act against their 
interests. In any case, the rule would allow a shareholder to nominate only one or two 
directors, who will be unable to pursue such activities even if they were elected. In one 
form of the proposal the right to nominate directors would arise only after certain trigger 
events that supposedly signal special corporate governance problems in the firm.152
If investors did manage to get some nominees elected, they would have no reason to 
fight rather than cooperate with management, except to the extent that management’s 
performance is inferior. Directors who are independent and effective should be welcomed 
by large investors rather than deterred from serving. The very existence of the rule could 
change the attitudes of executives and directors, making them more attentive to 
shareholder concerns so as to avoid a proxy challenge that would be embarrassing to 
incumbents, even if it failed. 
Nonetheless, the rule would impose some costs on corporations. Even if special 
interest investors could not use the rule to elect directors, they could use it as a vehicle to 
publicize their views at company expense. More important, the rule would probably 
produce little benefit.153 Again, the right to nominate candidates for the board may kick 
in only after certain uncommon trigger events. Shareholders making nominations would 
have to bear the expenses of proxy solicitations for their nominees if they lose and 
perhaps even if they win.154 They would also incur the wrath of managers, not only those 
they challenge, but of the corporate establishment generally.155 As a result, investors 
would probably not bother to nominate board candidates except in rare cases of broad 
dissatisfaction with incumbent management. The same defects in the proposal 
undoubtedly account for its lukewarm support from institutional investors. 
If rule 14a-11 is adopted and fails to generate much improvement, its failure “could 
justify consideration of more expansive reforms of corporate elections.”156 It is more 
likely, though, that the rule’s failure would deflate demands for further reform. The 
corporate establishment is now using SOX and other recent reforms to oppose further 
reforms like 14a-11. It will undoubtedly use the same tactic if 14a-11 is instituted and has 
little effect. The failure of 14a-11 would also dampen the enthusiasm of investors and 
bolster the opposition of managers to further changes in the same direction. 
The current impetus for corporate governance reform stems largely from the 
devastation wreaked by recent corporate catastrophes. As memories of those disasters 
fade, the inertia that generally prevents corporate governance reform will settle in again. 
 152. Security Holder Direct Nominations, Exchange Act Rel. No. 48,626, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (proposed 
Oct. 23, 2003). 
 153. See Bebchuk, supra note 55, at 50 n.17. Significantly, the ABA Task Force agrees: “The history of 
proxy contests shows how difficult it is to elect directors in opposition to management’s nominees . . . . New 
mechanisms will not likely result in significant numbers of shareholder-nominated directors being elected.” 
ABA Task Force Report, supra note 61, at 119-20. 
 154. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 43, at 484 (“Insurgents have no right to reimbursement out of corporate 
funds. Rather, an insurgent will be reimbursed only if an appropriate resolution is approved by a majority of 
both the board of directors and the shareholders.”). These expenses are substantial. See Bebchuk, supra note 
110, at 14-17. 
 155. See Bebchuk, supra note 55, at 50 (stating that shareholders will fear “litigation or company 
retaliation”). 
 156. Bebchuk, supra note 55, at 51. 
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We now have a window of opportunity for change (unless it has already closed).157 If we 
choose ineffective reforms, we will blow this opportunity, and may not get another until 
the next economic debacle. 
C. Enhanced Fiduciary Duties and Legal Liability 
Thirty-seven years ago Professor Bishop said, “[t]he search for cases in which 
directors of industrial corporations have been held liable... for negligence uncomplicated 
by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very large haystack. 
There is little evidence of liability even for Merovingian supineness.”158
There are occasional proclamations that the law is changing and that henceforth 
directors will incur liability if they are less than highly diligent and prudent. This 
happened after the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom159 
holding directors of TransUnion liable for approving a takeover bid. The proclamation 
proved wrong—the Delaware legislature enacted a law permitting corporations 
essentially to eliminate the duty of care160 and, more important, the Delaware Supreme 
Court showed itself no more eager to impose liability for lack of care after Van Gorkom 
than it had been before. Personal liability of directors remains almost unheard of.161
Now there are new claims of the emergence of a stringent duty of care based on the 
agreement of ten former directors of Enron to pay $13 million from their own pockets as 
part of a settlement of a class action against the board. This, too, seems to be a false 
alarm. The amount is small and, given the egregious facts of the Enron collapse, the case 
seems unlikely to have much precedential value.162
Occasionally a commentator calls for courts to impose tougher fiduciary duties,163 
and perhaps this would be a good idea. Delaware now holds directors liable for bad 
decisions only if an act is so unreasonable that it can be ascribed only to bad faith.164 
When interested transactions are approved by a majority of the disinterested directors, 
plaintiffs challenging the transaction have the difficult burden of proving that it was 
unfair to the corporation.165 Corporations might benefit if directors were required to be 
more diligent, reasonable, and skeptical. 
Under current conditions, however, tougher fiduciary standards would bring few 
benefits. Greater fear of liability might make boards more cautious than investors would 
like. Most directors own little of the company’s stock and therefore gain little if risky 
projects succeed. Fear of being sued over risky ventures could dissuade boards from such 
 157. See Bratton, supra note 50, at 25 (“The post Enron political climate has faded and management 
influence again registers.”). 
 158. Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in Indemnification of Corporate 
Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099-1101 (1968). 
 159. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 160. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2005). 
 161. See Bernard S. Black, et al., Liability Risk for Outside Directors, 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 153 (2005) 
(giving data). 
 162. See Lucian Bebchuk, What’s $13 Million Among Friends?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2005, at A17. 
 163. See Lisa Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through 
Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393 (2005). 
 164. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 255-56 (Del. 2000) (holding that directors breach the duty of care 
only if an act is so unreasonable as to be essentially inexplicable by anything other than bad faith). 
 165. See CLARK, supra note 115, at 147-48. 
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projects even if they could reasonably expect to be exonerated. Directors are insured 
against liability except for bad faith, so the main effect of higher fiduciary duties might 
be higher insurance premiums.166 If personal liability, even for gross negligence, 
nonetheless became a real possibility, many potential directors might refuse to serve—
especially those with substantial personal wealth. 
In any case, the states are unlikely to adopt stricter fiduciary duties. Van Gorkom 
triggered a storm of controversy and new legislation that essentially allowed Delaware 
companies to exempt themselves from its rule.167 The Delaware courts now seem to have 
tacitly abandoned Van Gorkom and have incurred no criticism for doing so. They have no 
incentive to ramp up fiduciary duties. 
D. Other Proposals 
Many other proposals to improve corporate governance are being advanced, and 
some are meritorious. Lucian Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan urge more liberal 
reimbursement of proxy expenses for insurgents who attain defined levels of support.168 
This may be a good idea, but it still leaves incumbents in control of the corporate proxy 
machinery; they can be dislodged only by a difficult and debilitating proxy fight. Paul 
MacAvoy and Ira Millstein, inter alia, would not allow the CEO also to be board 
chairman.169 This is also a good idea but, like other measures to enhance board 
disinterestedness, does nothing to insure that the board will be vigorous and wise.170 
Most public companies already have separate CEO and board chairman; their 
performance has not been shown to be superior. 
Removing barriers to unsolicited takeover bids would be beneficial. It would allow 
shareholders to receive the substantial takeover premiums that now are often blocked. It 
would also prod managers to improve the firm’s performance so as keep its share price 
high enough to ward off raiders. However, unsolicited takeovers are not a panacea, either. 
To attract most raiders, a target’s stock price must be far below potential value.171 
Contrary to some economic theory, there is little evidence that takeover targets are 
underperformers.172
Increased exposure to hostile bids may also create problems. It “may make it more 
difficult for corporate managers to foster long-term cooperation and commitment to the 
corporate enterprise by >team members’ other than shareholders.”173 It may increase the 
 166. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 43, at 299 (“After Smith v. Van Gorkom, director and liability insurance 
became very hard to get.”). 
 167. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 168. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy 
Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1135 (1990). See also Bebchuk, supra note 55, at 65-66 (proposing procedures  
that would make it easier for shareholders to remove the entire board). 
 169. MACAVOY & MILLSTEIN, supra note 12, at 4-5, 100. 
 170. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text (discussing inadequacy of measures to increase board 
independence). 
 171. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, 
Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 934-36 (2002) (giving data on takeover premiums). 
 172. See Anum Agrawal & Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Do Takeover Targets Underperform? Evidence from Operating 
and Stock Returns, 38 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 721 (2003). 
 173. Margaret M. Blair, Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can Teach Us, 1 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 1, 36 (2004). 
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cost of corporate debt.174 Many raiders overbid,175 and some stocks may be undervalued 
by the market,176 so even ably performing managers could be ousted by hostile bidders. 
Thus, removing antitakeover devices might induce managers not to improve corporate 
performance but to ward off raiders in ways even more damaging to shareholders. They 
might, for example, make unprofitable acquisitions, thereby dissipating free cash and the 
firm’s borrowing capacity, both of which attract raiders.177 In sum, the net benefits of 
eliminating antitakeover devices would be small. Further, like other reform proposals, 
this one is unlikely to be adopted. 
Jeffrey Gordon proposes expanded disclosure about executive compensation.178 
This too would have some benefits and might even be cost-effective, but its effect would 
be minor. First, this disclosure would motivate boards and CEOs to shift to prerequisites 
that do not require disclosure. Executives of public companies have (or used to have) 
lower compensation but more lavish prerequisites than comparable officers of private 
companies.179 The reason presumably is the desire in public companies to hide part of 
the executives’ benefits by putting it in the form of prerequisites that need not be 
disclosed. Executives presumably value direct more than indirect compensation; that is, 
they prefer the firm to give them an extra dollar of salary rather than spend it on a firm 
hunting lodge. Accordingly, expanded disclosure may merely cause a shift to less 
efficient forms of compensation. 
Calls for more disclosure also assume that it will lead to effective action, but this is 
dubious. Even if shareholders’ approval were required for a compensation package, the 
usual collective action problems deter them from investigating each firm’s package and 
waging a proxy fight if a package is unreasonable. For example, Enron’s compensation 
package encouraged the officers’ “obsession with short-term numbers.”180 How likely is 
it that even with enhanced disclosure, some Enron shareholders would have detected this 
problem and waged a successful fight to rectify it? Gordon posits that directors’ concern 
for their reputations will prod them to insist on efficient compensation,181 but hopes 
based on outside directors have always been dashed before,182 and there is no reason to 
think that this case would be any different. 
The most promising current proposal is that election of directors require a majority 
(rather than a plurality) shareholder vote.183 This rule would enable shareholders to 
 174. See Mark S. Klock et al., Does Corporate Governance Matter to Bondholders?, 40 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 693 (2005) (stating that antitakeover provisions lower the cost of debt financing). 
 175. In many, if not most, takeovers the acquirer’s stock price falls. See supra note 43. 
 176. In an efficient market, no stock should be undervalued. And, if a stock somehow were undervalued, a 
raider’s bid for it should alert the market, which would then correct the valuation. However, it is hard for 
managers to transmit complex proprietary information to the market. See supra note 126. The problem is 
exacerbated by the managers’ lack of credibility in the securities markets, especially in light of the frequency of 
false and misleading disclosures in recent years. Thus, markets may not always be efficient. 
 177. In one notable example, Paramount made a bid for Time conditioned on Time’s abandonment of its 
proposed acquisition of Warner. Time and Warner persisted, and Paramount dropped its bid. See generally 
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). 
 178. Gordon, supra note 27. 
 179. See MCEACHERN, supra note 36, at 65-66, 80, 87. 
 180. Bratton, supra note 50, at 1328. 
 181. Gordon, supra note 27, at 123-24. 
 182. See supra Part III.C. 
 183. See Louis Lavelle, A Simple Way to Make Boards Behave, BUS. WK., Jan. 31, 2005, at 38 (reporting 
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remove unsatisfactory directors without having to present a rival candidate. The threat of 
embarrassment would pressure boards to pay more heed to investors. Nonetheless, the 
proposal stops far short of a remedy for separation of ownership and control. First, the 
proposal is being advanced in nonbinding shareholder resolutions. It is always difficult to 
get shareholder approval of resolutions opposed by management.184 Even if resolutions 
are adopted, the boards most in need of reform are the ones most likely to ignore the 
resolution; already, “many boards routinely ignore shareholder resolutions even when 
they win.”185 Further, even with majority voting the disapproval of a candidate would 
leave the candidate on the board until a successor is chosen or create a vacancy, which in 
most states would be filled by the other directors.186
Even if majority election was imposed by law, its effects would still depend largely 
on the incumbents’ fear of embarrassment. Again, the worst boards are most likely to be 
impervious to shareholder rejection of some directors. Unless the entire board is rejected, 
the remnant could still govern as it pleases. A majority vote requirement would probably 
weed out only the worst directors; their replacements may be no better than mediocre.187
The requirement could also cause problems. Some major shareholders would still 
have to campaign against a board candidate. In so doing, they would incur financial costs, 
management retribution, and possibly legal difficulties.188 Companies with low 
shareholder turnout could have board candidates rejected despite small opposition. For 
instance, if only 51% of the shares were voted, a mere 2% negative vote would doom a 
candidate.189 In such cases, a minority of shareholders with a separate agenda (such as a 
union, a competitor, or a political faction) could torpedo a director it opposes with only a 
few votes. The prospect of an unpleasant campaign could deter good candidates from 
running. 
that this proposal has been submitted as a shareholder resolution at as many as 100 companies); Patrick 
McGeehan, It’s Voting Time Again, But No Isn’t an Option, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2005, § 3, at 4. The American 
Bar Association Business Law Section’s Committee on Corporate Laws is considering changing the Model 
Business Corporation Act to require a majority vote to elect directors. ABA Panel Weighing Possible Changes 
To Model Act on Voting for Directors, 8 Corp. Governance Rep. (BNA) 39 (Apr. 4, 2005). 
 184. At Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. a majority vote resolution in 2004 was supported by only 7.4% of the 
votes cast. Lavelle, supra note 183. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(b) (2005) (“Each director shall hold office until such director’s 
successor is elected and qualified or until such director’s earlier resignation or removal.”); id. § 142(e) (“Any 
vacancy occurring in any office of the corporation . . . shall be filled as the bylaws provide. In the absence of 
such provision, the vacancy shall be filled by the board of directors or other governing body.”). A majority vote 
requirement could also create unintended results in corporations with low voter turnout. If only 51% of the 
shares were voted and 49% were voted in favor of a board candidate, that candidate would not be elected even 
though the decision of holders of a mere 2% of the shares to vote against the candidate or to withhold their 
votes from her would hardly signal strong shareholder disapproval. 
 187. See Lavelle, supra note 183 (“In reality, only directors deemed to have been particularly bad stewards 
would likely be ousted.”). 
 188. For example, shareholders who cooperated in such an effort could trigger poison pills or Williams Act 
obligations. See generally Black, supra note 101, at 550-51, 556-59. 
 189. If, on the other hand, only a majority of the votes cast were required, shareholders would be forced to 
openly vote against a candidate, rather than just abstaining from voting. That necessity would increase their 
exposure to pressures from management. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
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V. REUNITING OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
A. Nomination of Directors by Major Shareholders 
Most serious legal problems do not admit of an easy solution. Fortunately, the 
problem of corporate governance does: The official slate of nominees for the board of 
directors on the corporation’s proxy statement should be chosen by a committee (the 
“Shareholders’ Committee”) comprising the corporation’s ten to twenty largest 
shareholders. This committee would only nominate candidates for the board; other 
shareholders (perhaps in cooperation with management) could run competing slates. 
However, given the uniformity of shareholders’ interests in maximizing share value,190 
such contests should be extremely rare. 
Creation of the Shareholders’ Committee will overcome the collective action 
problem that now denies shareholders, the owners of the corporation, true participation in 
control. Individual shareholders will not have to bear the costs of proxy solicitations. The 
Committee’s nominees will appear on the company’s proxy statement and the solicitation 
costs will be borne by the company. Even if the costs of serving on the Committee are 
borne by the members themselves, these costs should be small. If these costs nonetheless 
prove problematic, rules could provide for their reimbursement. 
This approach will result in nomination of better qualified directors. CEOs want 
passive boards. Despite increasingly stringent definitions of independence, many 
directors still have “soft” conflicts of interest that make them beholden to the CEO.191 In 
order to maximize the value of their stock in the company, the largest shareholders would 
have a strong motive to find and nominate the most independent and able people and give 
them the right incentives. Currently, cooperative directors are rewarded with re-
nomination, friendship, and often with side payments,192 all of which can be withheld 
from obstreperous directors. Directors who go along with the CEO acquire reputations as 
desirable directors and can hope for further directorships, while directors who rock the 
boat are rarely named to other boards. If directors were nominated by the largest 
shareholders, they would be rewarded for maximizing share value, and would act 
accordingly. 
The Shareholders Committee is not merely a solution to the corporate governance 
problem. It, or something quite similar, is probably the only solution. Since the 
fundamental problem of corporate governance is the separation of ownership and control, 
any solution must make governance responsive to the shareholders. That is, corporations 
must be managed so as to maximize shareholder wealth. This can be done only by vesting 
control in the shareholders. Since the total body of shareholders is too numerous to act 
together, there must be an effective way of selecting a representative group (i.e., a board 
of directors) responsive to the shareholders. Since collective action problems and rational 
 190. See infra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
 192. Even when an outside director has no affiliation with the CEO, he always has some interest that the 
CEO can serve. For example, the CEO can reward a cooperative director with a corporate contribution to the 
director’s favorite charity. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. In effect, if the director has no prior 
connection with the company, one can be created. 
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apathy also prevent most shareholders from making informed votes on a regular basis, the 
nomination process must serve as the effective choice point. Shareholder voting must 
serve only to rubber stamp the nomination process, except in rare circumstances. 
Likewise, most shareholders cannot take part in the nomination process, which therefore 
must be delegated to a group that is both competent and dedicated to maximizing share 
value. That group must be the corporation’s large institutional shareholders. 
B. Possible Objections 
1. The Unity of Shareholder Interests 
A common objection to shareholder primacy is that investors have various 
preferences; there is no united investor goal that boards could pursue even if they wanted 
to do so.193 The critique has two facets. First, some object that the supposed investor goal 
of maximizing share value is amorphous because it fails to distinguish between short-
term and long-term maximization and between the effects of accurate, as opposed to false 
and misleading, disclosure. Shareholders can profit from false disclosures only if they 
thereby pump up the stock price and then dump their own stock at the inflated price 
before the market wises up. 
In weighing the charge that institutional investors are obsessed with the short term 
(and all other objections), one must beware the Nirvana fallacy—that is, the fallacy that if 
an approach might create a problem, however remote the possibility and however trivial 
the problem, that approach must be rejected. Rather, as Winston Churchill recognized 
with respect to democracy, the question must be how a given system compares with the 
options.194 Assume, for instance, that some mutual funds might stress a portfolio 
company’s short-term performance so as to boost its stock price briefly and thereby 
improve the fund’s short-term performance. However, it is unlikely that a majority of 
nominating committee members would favor such a policy.195 Further, such members 
could not easily induce directors and managers to act on that preference. If needed, 
however, rules could deter such behavior. For example, private contacts between 
directors and nominating committee members and transactions between the corporation 
and committee members might be barred. 
Further, giving large shareholders a major role in corporate governance would 
 193. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Pension Funds Play Politics, TECH CENT. STATION, Apr. 21, 2004, 
http://www.techcentralstation.com/042104g.html (stating that “the interests of large and small shareholders 
often differ”); K.A.D. Camara, Classifying Institutional Investors, 30 J. CORP. L. 219 (2005) (noting that 
interests of different types of institutional shareholders may differ, and that some often do not seek 
maximization of share value); Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 61, at 78 (some shareholders, like labor unions 
and shareholders promoting social causes, pursue special interests); Rosenbaum, supra note 108, at 177-78 
(public pension funds have their own agendas). Concerning charges of short-termism, see supra notes 118-123 
and accompanying text. 
 194. “No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the 
worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” Winston 
Churchill (Nov. 11, 1947) (quoted in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 202 (4th ed. 1992)). 
 195. A fund might favor this tactic if it were trying to avoid an extremely bad quarter, which could prompt 
many investors to abandon the fund. It is unlikely, though, that many funds would have the same problem at the 
same time. 
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improve their attitudes by shifting their incentives. True, institutions attending 
informational sessions with corporate executives typically focus their questions on the 
next quarter’s earnings. The reason for this, though, is not that this is the only topic of 
interest to them, but that this is the only topic that executives consider appropriate and 
deserving of a straight answer. Serious questions about a company’s long-term strategy 
would be treated as hostile and brushed off with a reiteration of statements from the 
company’s annual report. 
With a significant voice in control, large shareholders would be able to focus on 
long-term strategy and have strong reasons to do so. Like all shareholders, they will want 
to optimize the performance of companies in which they invest. Further, many 
institutional investors compete for funds. Currently these institutions make some effort to 
compete on the basis of ability to pick winners, but savvy investors know that their 
claims are largely empty: the relative performance of mutual funds tends to rise and fall 
in a random walk.196
If these institutions participated in control of portfolio companies, they would 
compete by trying to improve the performance of those companies. Not only their own 
investors but other shareholders of the portfolio company would ask what criteria they 
use in nominating and evaluating corporate directors. It is hard to imagine the institutions 
would claim any pole star other than maximization of share value. Could they make such 
statements but then secretly instruct directors to stress the short term? Such a ploy would 
be hard to carry out and would run a risk of suits for fraud. Moreover, directors 
concerned about their reputations and prospects for directorships with that and other 
companies would have a strong motive to ignore such instructions. In short, under a 
system of shareholder committees several vectors would push corporate governance away 
from emphasis on the short term and toward emphasis on maximizing share value. 
Nonetheless, if fear of short-termism were a fatal objection to this plan, membership on 
the shareholder committee could be limited to investors who have held their stock in the 
company for a specified minimum period. In any case, under the current manager-
dominated corporate governance system, deviation from the goal of maximizing share 
value is far greater than it would be under a system with shareholder domination. 
Managers are often more interested in empire-building than in maximizing share value 
and, because their investments are not diversified, they have greater opportunities and 
motives than would institutional investors to engage in pump-and-dump schemes.197 
Managers with high-powered incentive compensation may also take excessive risks.198
Critics of shareholder primacy also charge that maximizing share price is not the 
primary goal of all investors. Some, like employees and suppliers, may prefer growth and 
caution.199 Others, like public pension funds, may have political goals, like maximizing 
 196. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 24 (2003) (stating that future steps 
or directions cannot be predicted based on past actions). 
 197. See supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text. 
 198. See David J. Denis et al., Is There a Dark Side to Incentive Compensation? 2 (Mar. 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=695583 (noting that “the convexity of options 
gives managers the incentive to take excessive risk”). 
 199. Since employees cannot diversify their investments of human and financial capital, they are risk-
averse, while non-employee shareholders are risk-neutral. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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the company’s employment in the fund’s home state.200 However, such shareholders are 
a small minority; the vast majority favor maximizing share value.201 Moreover, society 
benefits from the efficiency that results from pursuing this goal.202
2. Opportunism 
Another possible objection to nomination of directors by major shareholders is that 
those shareholders might use their power to benefit themselves through insider trading or 
interested transactions with the company. Some contend that some institutional investors 
already gain privileged access to inside information and trade on it.203
These concerns cannot be categorically dismissed, but they are minor, far smaller 
than related problems under current practices, and can be further reduced by some simple 
steps. Interested transactions between a corporation and its directors are already a 
problem.204 By contrast, public investors do not now fear large shareholders but welcome 
them. A company’s stock price generally rises when a large investor buys a big block of 
its stock.205 Public investors clearly do not expect the large shareholder to exploit them 
but protect their (mutual) interests. 
Members of a shareholder committee would have incentives to curb insider trading 
and interested transactions by managers and directors. They would have few 
 200. See MICHAEL T. JACOBS, SHORT-TERM AMERICA 53 (1991) (stating that public pension fund trustees 
are mostly political appointees with their own “political agendas”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus 
Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1335 (1991); Rosenbaum, 
supra note 108, at 177; Camara, supra note 193, at 27 (stating that the interests of different types of institutional 
investors sometimes differ and that some do not seek maximization of share value). 
 201. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 43, at 469-70 n.15 (“Although investors have somewhat different 
preferences on issues such as dividends and the like, they are generally united by a desire to maximize share 
value.”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 883-84 
(2005) (arguing that shareholders generally favor maximizing long-term share value); Rock, supra note 95, at 
466 (stating that “the potential for conflict between large and small shareholders will likely be minimal”); 
Damon A. Silvers & Michael I. Garland, The Origins and Goals of the Fight for Proxy Access, in 
SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE CORPORATE BALLOT (Lucian Bebchuck ed., 2004) (showing that among eight 
firms writing letters to oppose Rule 14a-11, the largest union or state pension fund held less than .75% of the 
company’s shares). As evidence, note that the “only [shareholder] resolutions that systematically obtain 
majority support are ones calling for changes that are viewed as value enhancing by a wide range of financial 
institutions.” Bebchuk, supra note 110, at 32. 
 202. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962). 
 203. See Bin Ke & Kathy Petroni, How Informed Are Actively Trading Institutional Investors? Evidence 
from Their Trading Behavior Before a Break in a String of Consecutive Earnings Increases (Jan. 14, 2004) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=448720 (alleging that some institutional 
investors already profit from trading on inside information). 
 204. See supra note 145 and accompanying text; see also Stewart, supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 205. See Michael Barclay & Clifford Holderness, The Law and Large Block Trades, 35 J.L. & ECON. 265 
(1992) (presenting a study showing that minority shareholders generally gain substantially when a large block 
of a company’s stock is sold at a premium); Clifford Holderness & Dennis Sheehan, The Role of Majority 
Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations: An Exploratory Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 317 (1988); Andrei 
Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461, 465-71 (1986) 
(stating that the presence of large non-management shareholders benefits small shareholders). In a dramatic 
recent example, shares of General Motors surged 18% when Kirk Kerkorian made an offer to acquire 9% of the 
stock. Danny Hakim, Kerkorian Seeking 9% Stake in G.M., N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2005, at C1. Large institutional 
shareholdings are also associated with more favorable share price reactions to the selection of a new CEO. See 
Mark R. Huson et al., Managerial Succession and Firm Performance, 74 J. FIN. ECON. 237 (2004). 
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opportunities to extract private benefits, and would not welcome such conduct by other 
committee members, so committees will have incentives to monitor themselves.206 
Directors will not want to risk liability or disrepute by approving company transactions 
with committee members or by feeding insider information to them. The law already 
prohibits trading on inside information and polices interested transactions under a “strict 
scrutiny” standard,207 and would continue to do so. Again, rules restricting contacts 
between committee members and directors might reduce any potential problems here. 
3. Exploitation of Non-Shareholder Constituencies 
The team-production model holds that shareholder control would be undesirable 
because it would disadvantage non-shareholder constituencies. This charge is 
contradicted by both theory and evidence.208
4. Locking In Capital 
Some adherents of the team-production model posit that shareholder rights are weak 
as part of the design of corporate law to lock in capital.209 The claim is feeble.210 Ease of 
dissolution can pose a problem in business organizations, but the problem it poses is 
exploitation by a wealthier owner in a closely held firm by forcing an auction of the 
firm’s assets when the other owners lack funds to bid the true value of the assets, so that 
the wealthier owner gets to grab the assets at a bargain price.211 Clearly this is not a 
concern with public companies. 
It is hard to see what other problem there could be that makes it advisable to lock in 
the shareholders as a body. Shareholders certainly have no incentive to break up the 
company through dissolution unless the firm would be more valuable that way than as a 
going concern. If the shareholders as a body want to cash in their investment, the logical 
step is to sell the firm as a going concern. That is what actually happens in an acquisition. 
In that case, stakeholders and society as a whole suffer no loss of the (wealth-increasing) 
productive capacity of the firm. 
Some aspects of the corporate form are necessary to protect creditors, but this has 
nothing to do with the separation of ownership and control. Creditors suffer if dividend 
payments leave a corporation with insufficient assets to pay its debts. Corporate law 
handles this concern by forbidding such dividends,212 not by trusting in a board free of 
shareholder control. Indeed, when it serves the interests of managers, boards can slight 
 206. See Black, supra note 78, at 887 (“If a half-dozen institutions must act jointly to exercise effective 
voice, the institutions can watch each other at the same time that they’re watching corporate managers.”). 
 207. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, CORPORATIONS 581 (5th ed. 2006). 
 208. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text. 
 209. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 253; Margaret M. Blair, 
Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 
UCLA L. REV. 387, 391 (2003); Blair, supra note 173, at 3. 
 210. It also contradicts some other claims of the team productions theorists. See supra note 75 and 
accompanying text. 
 211. See, e.g., Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 45 (Cal. 1961) (holding that a partner’s dissolution by express 
will violates his fiduciary duties if he is trying to force an auction of the firm’s assets in order to “appropriate to 
his own use the new prosperity of the partnership without adequate compensation to his copartner”). 
 212. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a) (2005). 
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the interests of creditors.213
There is one constituency that does profit from locking in the shareholders—the 
managers. The difficulty shareholders face in selling the firm’s entire equity allows 
managers to favor their own interests over the shareholders’ with little fear of being 
ousted by a takeover. There is abundant evidence that managers in fact seize this 
opportunity. In sum, the inability of shareholders is not part of the solution but part of the 
problem. 
C. Implementation  
1. The Prospects for Institutional Shareholder Activism 
The joke is often told of the economist walking with a student who says, “Professor, 
that looks like a $20 bill on the street. Shall I pick it up?” The economist replies, “Of 
course not. If it really were a $20 bill, someone else would already have picked it up.” If 
the Shareholders’ Committee is such a great idea, why hasn’t someone already picked it 
up? The answer lies in the collective action problems and legal obstacles that investors 
face. In pluralistic and representative democracies a minority often prevails over a 
majority even if the policy favored by the minority is in sum less beneficial to society 
than some other policy. If the minority individuals’ interests in the issue are greater than 
the majority individuals’ interests, the latter have less incentive than the minority to 
contest the issue. 
Although the costs of managerial domination to investors exceed the benefits to 
corporate executives, even the largest institutional investors lack the incentive to fight for 
change; the costs to an institution to fight for change would be immense, but the 
institution would realize only its pro rata share of the benefits. In contrast, corporate 
executives have an intense interest in preserving the status quo and access to corporate 
treasuries to ward off threats to their hegemony. 
However, the costs of collective action by investors are falling and should continue 
to fall. Organizations like Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), the leading proxy 
advisory service, are becoming more effective at coordinating investor activity.214 As 
institutional portfolios grow, the largely fixed costs of activism decline on a percentage 
basis. 
In recent years institutions have increased their participation in corporate 
governance, and their experience makes it likely that this trend will continue. It was once 
rare for institutions to undertake proxy fights over antitakeover devices. They now do so 
regularly, and often win.215  Recent corporate scandals, the flaws of Sarbanes-Oxley as a 
cure for corporate governance problems, and the apparent defeat of rule 14a-11 should all 
 213. See generally GILSON & BLACK, supra note 43, at 627 (citing Arthur Warga & Ivo Welch, Bondholder 
Losses in Leveraged Buyouts, 6 REV. FIN. STUD. 959 (1993)) (showing substantial market losses in bonds of 
companies in leveraged buyouts); Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205 
(1988) (stating that a firm’s bond rating is routinely downgraded after a highly leveraged takeover).  
 214. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access: A Response to the Business Roundtable, 
55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 557, 564 (2005) (stating that many institutional shareholders follow ISS or some other 
advisory service). 
 215. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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awaken institutions to the pressing need for new reforms. More institutions are now 
backing resolutions to require a majority shareholder vote for election of directors.216 As 
these resolutions involve election of directors, they intrude further into corporate 
governance than resolutions against antitakeover devices. 
A child must learn to crawl before it can walk, and to walk before it can run. In the 
corporate governance race, institutional investors learned to crawl and are now mastering 
walking. Learning to run may be next. 
2. The Prospects for Legislation 
In the wake of the evident defeat of rule 14a-11 by the corporate establishment, 
legislation to institute shareholder nominating committees does not seem politically 
feasible; investors are still too scattered and disorganized to achieve any substantial 
reform. The forces that have prevented a “race to the top” in state corporate laws217 make 
it unlikely that any state legislature will embrace shareholder nominating committees in 
an effort to swipe corporate franchise business from Delaware. 
There is, however, some reason for hope. The growing assertiveness and 
coordination of institutional investors may alter the political balance of forces. In 
particular, the SEC might become amenable to a quasi-substantive disclosure 
requirement. When the Commission desires a substantive change but lacks authority to 
impose it, it has at times adopted a disclosure rule that has the practical effect of requiring 
public companies to make the change the SEC wants. 
Thus when it wanted to stop unfair going private transactions but could not do so 
directly, the SEC adopted a rule requiring a company going private to state whether it 
believes that the terms of the deal are fair to public shareholders.218 As a practical as well 
as a legal matter, the company must say that it does so believe. Shareholders who 
consider the term unfair can then sue under the federal securities laws by claiming that 
the company’s statement is false. More recently Congress used the same ploy in 
Sarbanes-Oxley by requiring each company to have a financial expert on its audit 
committee or explain why it does not.219 In practice, of course, the company cannot say 
that its audit committee has no financial expert. 
The SEC could instead require each company to state whether it has a shareholder-
controlled or a self-perpetuating nomination process for its board of directors. At least at 
first, some companies might defiantly cling to the latter, but experience with the 
shareholder-controlled process should soon overcome such resistance. 
3. The Possibility of Private Reform 
Investors could demand that corporations institute shareholder nominating 
committees on their own. Nothing in corporate law prohibits such a move. Such efforts 
 216. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
 218. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1014 (1999) (requiring a company to “[s]tate whether the subject company . . . 
reasonably believes that the [going private] transaction is fair or unfair to unaffiliated security holders”). 
 219. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745; 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h)(1)(iii) 
(2005) (requiring that the registrant “must explain why it does not have an audit committee financial expert” if 
that is the case). 
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now seem unlikely, but this situation may change. Again, institutional investors have 
gradually become more assertive in corporate governance. Some investors already 
appreciate the importance of shareholder rights to share value,220 and that appreciation is 
likely to grow. 
Managers would furiously resist such efforts because they would end management 
domination, something no other reform has done or threatens to do. CEOs could exact 
reprisals against rebellious institutional investors. Further, most managers have links with 
other business executives through interlocking memberships on boards, charitable 
foundations and industry organizations.221 Managers facing demands for real shareholder 
democracy could expect fellow members of the business aristocracy to join in punishing 
insurgents, a daunting prospect for investors. 
The most likely candidates for shareholder uprisings are poorly performing 
companies, especially those where managers have committed serious wrongs. Already 
some institutional investors are now willing to step forward and seek corporate 
governance changes in such firms.222 Experiments may begin with something less than 
complete cession of board nominations to a shareholder committee. Such a committee 
might be authorized to nominate a minority or half of the board, or a couple of the largest 
shareholders could be added to existing nominating committees comprised solely of 
directors.223 Experience with such half-measures could lead to experiments with full 
shareholder control. 
4. Impetus for Reform: The Globalization of Financial Markets 
Two possible triggers of corporate governance reform would be a recession or 
another series of corporate scandals accompanied by a plunging stock market. Neither of 
these is to be desired. There is another possibility, however: globalization of financial 
markets. Until recently, America faced limited competition for investment capital. Legal 
and practical obstacles restricted capital flows across national boundaries. More 
important, only a few industrialized countries were a viable alternative location for 
investment, and even these countries had legal systems and traditions less solicitous of 
investors than America’s. America could be complacent about treatment of investors 
without fear of hemorrhaging capital. 
Those days are over. Other countries are reforming their corporate governance 
systems to be more responsive to shareholders.224 Nations like China and India that not 
long ago held no attraction for investors now compete vigorously for capital. The stakes 
in this competition are steep. For years the United States has been able to run huge trade 
deficits because foreigners have been willing to invest their trade surplus here. If America 
 220. Thus some analysts weigh shareholder rights when valuing stocks. See supra note 96. 
 221. See Larcker et al., supra note 56 (documenting the correlation between such links and executive 
compensation). 
 222. See supra note 107. 
 223. Some states permit exercise of the usual powers of the board by other persons if so provided in the 
certificate of incorporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001). 
 224. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 128, at 440; The Bell Tolls for Germany Inc., BUS. WK., Aug. 
15, 2005, at 40, 40-41 (“Germany’s banks . . . are under severe pressure from foreign shareholders to boost 
returns to the lofty levels of U.S. and British rivals . . . . As a result, German managers now receive almost daily 
reminders of the power of international capital.”). 
[DENT] FINAL 5/10/2006  4:02:20 PM 
2005] Corporate Governance: Still Broke, No Fix in Sight 75 
 
ceases to be the premiere locus of investment and becomes just one of many competitors 
for capital, we could suffer serious capital outflows. 
That discharge would have grave repercussions for many constituencies. The 
American standard of living is determined by its productivity and treatment of investment 
capital is a crucial element of productivity. Previously, it has not been thought of that 
way; from now on, it must be. Even a country with efficient workers cannot prosper if, 
for example, the fruits of their labor are looted by a corrupt government because investors 
will not fund businesses unless they expect attractive profits. Likewise, if our corporate 
governance system condones waste and inefficiency, investment here will flag, American 
workers will have to accept lower compensation, and the entire economy will falter. 
If this threat is recognized, the political vectors impinging on corporate governance 
will change. American financial institutions have particular reasons for concern. Investors 
send funds to institutions in countries where they want to invest. If America becomes less 
appealing to investors, our financial institutions will suffer. They should take the lead in 
demanding better corporate governance. Their efforts should include publicizing the 
importance of the issue to other constituencies, which should lend their support once they 
grasp the threat. 
D. Peripheral Benefits 
Many subsidiary issues about the composition and role of the ideal board have been 
debated for decades: How large should it be? How many insiders (if any) should it have?  
Are professional directors desirable? How often should the board meet?  How far should 
it intrude into strategic planning?  Should it have its own staff?  How should directors be 
compensated? 
Empirical answers to these questions have been impossible because of board 
domination by CEOs. For example, studies have found no correlation between a 
corporation’s performance and the percentage of outsiders on its board,225 but this fact 
may merely reflect that CEOs now dominate the selection and conduct of both outside 
directors and subordinate inside directors. If directors were truly chosen by shareholders, 
their incentives would be different. This does not necessarily mean that boards would 
eschew insiders. It may be that subordinate officers, freed from the fetters of 
groupthink226 and at least from overt domination by the CEO, would prove a fertile 
source of knowledge and ideas for outside directors. 
Real shareholder control would foster a natural laboratory in which various 
approaches would be tested to see what works best. Competition could be spirited. 
Members of each firm’s Shareholder Committee will seek to optimize the firm’s 
performance in order to optimize the members’ performance. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite repeated waves of reform for 75 years, corporate governance still suffers the 
same basic problem identified by Berle and Means in the 1930s—the separation of 
ownership and control. The corporate scandals and stock market retreat of 2000-2001 
 225. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
 226. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. 
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triggered a new spate of changes, but these too seem destined to fail. Moreover, as 
outrage over business fraud fades and the stock market stabilizes, political pressure for 
further reform has subsided, so that even the modest change in the SEC’s proposed rule 
14a-11 has been aborted. The time does not seem propitious for a serious effort to end 
managerial hegemony. 
Nonetheless, latent forces could soon revive the impetus for change. The recovery of 
stock indices is weak; they remain far below their highs of 2000. Institutional investors 
are gradually learning to be more assertive. If America’s trade deficit continues to deepen 
and the value of the dollar continues to fall, more attention will focus on corporate 
governance as a crucial factor in attracting investment capital. At that point there will be 
renewed concern to end the separation of ownership and control. 
This Article has offered a means of solving that problem. Transferring the 
nomination of directors from a self-perpetuating board to a Shareholders Committee 
comprised of a company’s largest shareholders will align governance structures with the 
goal of investors to maximize efficiency and with it, share value. The only losers from 
this revolution would be CEOs who wish not to optimize corporate performance but to 
rule over a personal fiefdom. The winners will not only be investors but the entire 
economy, which is to say, all Americans. 
 
